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Questions of legality apart, nations' experience of maritime war zones or exclusion zones has demonstrated the utility of these juridical! 
strategic devices for both offensive and defensive purposes.1 For example, in 
World War I and in World War II both sides created prohibited war zones 
for offensive reasons. On the other hand, in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
1905), the Japanese Government created defensive war zones.2 Similarly, both 
Argentina and the United Kingdom created what each belligerent claimed 
to be its defensive war zones in the Falklands ("Malvinas") Islands Conflict 
of 1982.3 States declare maritime exclusion zones offensively when they seek 
to interdict shipping into a target state or port in order to embargo that 
country's trade, especially its trade in war materiel and food. They declare 
them defensively when they seek to interdict shipping, or selected types of 
shipping (for example, warships and merchant ships carrying military 
supplies, or acting as auxiliary naval ships), from entering approaches to the 
territory they are defending from invasion. 
With regard to offensively-oriented naval exclusion zones, the Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare Publication 9)4 
correctly points out that, while the traditional rules of blockade required a 
"relatively 'close-in' cordon of surface warships stationed in the immediate 
vicinity of the blockaded area,"5 the contemporary development of weapons 
and tactics creates a situation which cannot be reconciled with this means 
of enforcement. NWP-9 continues: 
The so-called long-distance blockade of both World Wars departed materially from 
those traditional rules and were justified instead upon the belligerent right of reprisal 
against illegal acts of warfare on the part of the enemy.6 
NWP-9 also points out the difficulties, indeed, impossibilities, of an in-
shore blockade in light of modern weapon systems and platforms, 
"particularly nuclear-powered submarines, supersonic aircraft, and cruise 
missiles. "7 
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Without comnuttmg itself as to whether contemporary methods and 
weapons for waging war at sea have brought about legal change in the context 
of the offensive use of restricted or prohibited war zones, NWP-9 concludes 
its discussion of this topic with the observation that: 
The [United States] blockade of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports [was] 
accomplished by the emplacement of mines, [and] was undertaken in conformity with 
traditional criteria of establishment, notification, effectiveness, limitation, and 
impartiality.8 
While the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors may have observed 
some of the traditional, maritime, siege-type, requirements ofblockade,9 and 
complied with Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic 
Submarine MineslO it did not entirely meet the traditional requirements of 
a close-in blockade since a blockading fleet "within visual range of the coast"l1 
was not constantly present outside those ports. Indeed, the system of "Market-
Time" (which related only to the coast of South Vietnam) apart, the United 
States tended to rely on the air arm as well as on surface warships (under 
Operation "Sea Dragon") for purposes of blockading North Vietnam.12 Also 
the use of floating mines activated by such agencies as sound and vibration 
was not in compliance with Hague Convention VIII. 
When reviewing the resort to maritime exclusion zones as instruments for 
justifying attacks against unarmed merchant ships, this paper will examine 
the strategies of the proclaiming states asserting rights to establish such zones. 
While both defensively and offensively used exclusion zones are instruments 
for logistical strategies,13 that is, strategies directed to the denial of supplies, 
reinforcements, and replacements to the enemy, these may be conducted in 
terms of either "persisting" and "holding" or alternatively "raiding" 
strategies.14 It will be a further thesis of this paper that to establish maritime 
exclusion zones merely for the purpose of implementing raiding strategies, 
whereby power is exercised not by the maintenance of control but by 
indicating an intention to engage in adventitious attacks on random shipping, 
is invalid. In addition, such a strategy involves a politically contradictory 
posture. Since the assumptions underlying policies of establishing exclusion 
zones include the need for effectiveness and persistence, the fortuitous nature 
of zones enforced only by raiding strategies reveal them as being only 
haphazardly enforced. Simply to enforce a zone at random times and engage 
in random attacks arises from the lack of an essential ratio of power to space 
and time which the sufficient mastery of the area and effective exclusion of 
the enemy require. Such a result can only be achieved by a persisting strategy. 
This calls for an adequate ratio of power to space and time such that control 
of the area can be completely assured. In addition to the issues of the strategies 
involved (that is, offensive/defensive; logistical! combat; raiding/persisting) 
there are, of course, other variables that need to be borne in mind: the 
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reasonableness of the zone both in size and in relation to the object(s) the 
proclamation( s) seek to achieve; its effectiveness in terms of contemporary 
weapons technology; and proportionality both in terms of the ratio of force 
to space and time and in terms of enforcement and sanctions. 
This chapter will review, first, the legality or illegality of prohibited or 
exclusion zones in terms of persisting and raiding strategies, that is, resort 
to either or both strategies in order to deny the enemy's access to the economic 
resources; and, secondly, in terms of such zones when they are resorted to 
for defensive persisting strategies which reflect their use "as a moat defensive 
to a house".15 In this latter mode, the commander's object is to exclude the 
enemy's shipping from an ocean area on the presumption that the excluded 
ships may otherwise attack the state through, or across, the proclaimed zone. 
In all cases where these strategie~ are used, the issue of military utility, targets, 
and means and methods will be treated as essential to the analysis. 
Furthermore, the importance of the principle of distinction and of the 
obligation to respect non-participating, neutral shipping, will be stressed. This 
final criterion is variable and dependent on a number of factors such as the 
geographical location of the zone proclaimed, the density and quantity of the 
traffic affected, and the geographical extent of the hostilities. 
In the pages that follow a considerable emphasis will be laid on the use 
of maritime prohibited zones for purposes of carrying out, or attempting to 
carry out, logistical strategies. But, while there are possibly more striking 
examples of this (that is, logistical) use of the zones under review, it must 
be stressed that the zones are used for defensive and offensive combat 
strategies as well. In this latter (combat) connection they can be useful as 
adjuncts, rather like the use of mine fields on land or sea by an attacking 
force. Their function, in this last scenario, is that of diverting an adversary 
into a "killing ground." 
II. A Review of State Assertions of Maritime Exclusion 
Zones in Times of War or Armed Conflict 
A. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05 
The investigator today, seeing the proliferation of exclusionary zones in 
conflicts which have arisen from very divergent and disparate circumstances, 
may be surprised that there was little cavil regarding what has been 
denominated as the earliest declaration of such a zone. In the Russo-Japanese 
War, 1904-05, Japan established maritime defense zones which Hall described 
in the following terms: 
Prior to the outbreak of war with Russia, the Japanese Government empowered the 
Minister of Marine, or the Commander-in-Chief, ... to designate certain areas 
adjacent to the islands of the Japanese Empire as "Defense sea areas." ... On and after 
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the outbreak of war twelve or more of such areas were notified, the boundaries of which 
in some cases ran as far as ten miles from Iand.16 
In enforcing these defensive zones by its persisting holding strategy, the 
Japanese Government evinced an adequate ratio of force to both time and 
space. This effectiveness enabled that country's naval forces to seize and 
condemn, as prize of war, the neutral French ship Quang-Nam on the ground 
of her presence within the prohibited area.!7 In additio~ to stressing the 
historical and legal importance of the Japanese Navy's persistently maintained 
and effective defense zones, note should also be taken of the establishment, 
in the Russo-Japanese War, of an early forerunner (created by the necessity 
of a then contemporary technological innovation of radio) of the 1982 British 
Moving Defensive Area (or "Bubble") concept18 for the protection of her 
forces in the South Atlantic against both attack and intelligence-gathering. 
In the earlier conflict, namely the Russo-Japanese War, the British ship 
Haiman had been fitted with a DeForest wireless telegraph apparatus. She 
also had a representative of the Times of London on board. Messages were 
sent over this apparatus in cypher to Wei-Hai-W ei (at that time a British 
possession on the Shantung Peninsula of China and located close to the sea 
areas where both belligerents were conducting their naval operations). These 
messages were transmitted to London over a neutral cable and thus were 
available for newspaper publication. 
The Haiman was visited several times by Japanese warships and once by 
the Russian cruiser Bayan. She was instructed not to engage in broadcasting 
naval operations. Subsequently, however, as a result of the concerns of 
Admiral Alexieff, the Russian authorities in the Far East promulgated, on 
AprilS, 1904, an instruction to the effect that correspondents broadcasting 
within the zone of operations of the Russian fleet should be treated as spies. 
The severity of the sanction imposed in the promulgation was adversely 
criticized in the British House of Commons. In the House there was general 
agreement that the Russian Admiral and the Czar's Viceroy in the Far East 
should, rather, have had recourse to the remedies for unneutral service 
(confiscation of the ship, her cargo, etc.), rather than accusing and punishing 
the offender for the capital crime of espionage19 even if the correspondent 
had been found, contrary to the tenets of his profession, to be transmitting 
information to the Japanese authorities. It should be noted, however, that 
the debate only criticized the threat to resort to the extreme penalty, and 
did not question the authority of both fleets to restrict news gathering and 
dissemination on the high seas, despite neutrals' expectations that the 
belligerents would respect their journalists' right to enjoy those freedoms. 
Clearly, the belligerents' encroachments on the neutral states' privileges were 
acceptable, provided they remained reasonable and balanced as between the 
interests in play. On the other hand, Admiral Alexieff remained unmoved 
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by the neutrals' protests. Hence, the Russian position, since it threatened the 
extreme sanction of death (probably by hanging),20 rather than the penalty 
appropriate for non-neutral service, should be treated as failing the 
reasonableness and proportionality tests. 
After declaring war on Germany in April 1917, the United States issued 
orders similar to the Japanese 1904 regulations. They controlled navigation 
in defined areas and around named American ports. These were maintained 
by an effective persistent holding and defensive strategy, despite the fact that, 
at some points the distance of the circumference of an area from a given center 
was as far as ten miles21 (a similar distance to that in the Japanese orders). 
Regarding these orders, Hall observed that: 
The Japanese and American orders were based on the principle of defense, and it appears 
to be on such a principle that claims to establish war zones or areas of the high seas 
from which neutrals may be excluded can be supported. The legitimacy in any given 
case must be determined by circumstances.22 
Hence it may be asserted that exclusionary zones created purely for 
defensive purposes, and provided they are persistently maintained and 
rendered effective by virtue of the ratio of power to space and time, and 
carry proportionate sanctions for breach, have for some time now, come to 
have been approved by the international community. This approval is testified 
to by the lack of protest or resistance to both the Japanese and American 
proclamations and an agreement among publicists that they fall within the 
test of reasonableness.23 But today the types of exclusion zones calling for 
legal analysis involve more complex methods and tactics for enforcement, 
cover far larger sea areas, and are established for many more diverse ends 
than was the case with these early and relatively modest and straightforward 
forerunners. 
B. World War 1,1914-18 and The Interwar Period 
In World Wars I and II prohibited zones were set up by both sides for 
the purpose of staging a ruthless and almost effective aggressive logistical 
strategy.24 Their objects were to blockade the enemy to.bring him to his knees 
by starvation and the denial of war materiel. This is, of course, the complete 
opposite of the resort to exclusion zones for defensive purposes by the Japanese 
in 1904-05. As has already been pointed out, both of the blockades of World 
War I were denounced as illegal by their target (enemy) states. Indeed, while 
certain limited forms of maritime exclusion zones have, in recent years, been 
increasingly achieving recognition as lawful, in the period of the two World 
Wars and the interval between, only those maritime zones which were modest 
as to purpose and strictly limited as to area (such as those established by Japan 
in 1904 and the United States in 1917) were accepted as lawful. Hence the 
German unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and the Anglo-
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American "Starvation Blockade" w~re claimed to have been justified by their 
executants as constituting appropriate reprisals. Indeed, it should be noted 
that the accepted doctrine and practice regarding belligerent reprisals has long 
been predicated on the otherwise unlawfulness of the conduct constituting 
the reprisaL That conduct becomes justified only by the previous unlawfulness 
of the adversary's original act. Despite its intrinsic illegality, the act of reprisal 
is claimed to be justified as a sanction against that prior illegal act and becomes 
legitimate as a means of putting pressure on the target state to desist from 
continuing in its prior unlawful conduct.25 
The maritime exclusion zones created by the belligerents started with the 
stigma of unlawfulness mitigated only by the previous unlawfulness of the 
adversary's conduct giving rise to the drastic response of resorting to reprisals. 
Neither party, however, claimed that new weapons and tactics had given rise, 
as a matter of necessity, to the emergence of a customary norm justifying 
their prohibited zones. Furthermore, each side argued that the other's reprisal 
(that is, maritime exclusion zone) was illegal even as a reprisaL26 In addition, 
an assertion of customary international law justification would, most 
probably, have been met with outrage and derision by the neutral states 
(which, down to April 2, 1917, included the United States of America). But 
the purpose of this chapter is to learn whether, since 1918, subjects of the 
international legal order have come to recognize, as customary international 
law, and aside from the very questionable arguments based on reprisals, at 
least some maritime prohibited zones which are established in time of war. 
Such an inquiry calls for the substantiation of criteria for establishing the 
validity of certain of these tactical and strategic devices. The point of referring 
to justifications predicated on reprisals was to indicate merely that neither 
party, and especially the United Kingdom, was prepared to risk that its policy, 
if failing the test of legality on the basis of the emergence of a customary 
norm, would draw upon itself the stigma of illegal conduct based on a spurious 
argument. But nowadays such arguments in terms of reprisals are, in light 
of emerging customary norms, largely anachronistic. 
(1) Traditional Blockade-A Time-Honored Logistical Strategy 
Revisiting the older and well established rules, the investigation which 
follows will begin with reviewing the legal institution of blockade as it had 
evolved over some two centuries previous to World War I, and had been 
defined, in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, by treaty. 
Originally, the requirement was that a blockade to be valid and opposable 
to neutral shipping, had to be "close-in and, of course, persisting in terms 
of the necessary ratio of force to space and time." While weapons did not 
render such a blockade suicidal (as today's military arsenal clearly would), 
it was, in the heyday of sail, not without considerable risks and challenges 
to the blockading commanders. This is illustrated in a British naval historian's 
review of the "close-in" blockade of Brest during the French Revolutionary 
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and Napoleonic Wars reflecting as it did both a persisting holding strategy 
and a necessary ratio of force to space and time: 
Brest, where the principal fleet of the French was lying, commanded by Admiral 
Ganteaume is in the north-east corner of the Bay. Outside it is a rocky coast and a 
wicked stretch of sea, foggy, cold and stormy. Strong tides set through the narrow sounds 
inside the Isle ofUshant, and the prevailing wind, southwesterly, blows onshore with 
the whole of the open Atlantic behind it to build up a sea and swell. Even the sailing 
ships of modern times, such as they are, are advised to keep well offshore. Collingwood, 
who commanded the blockade in the '90s, had said that this coast was more dangerous 
than a battle once a week. 
Yet to keep the approaches to Brest under observation, Collingwood had to be close. 
Ships of the line in those days were unhandy vessels, slow to windward and slow to 
go about. Embayed on a lee shore with an incoming swell, they could never be sure 
of clawing off again. Caught in a calm, they were helpless against a tide that might 
set them into unnavigable sounds. Yet night and day, summer and winter, Collingwood 
and his captains stood off and on that shore, estimating the tidal streams and currents, 
constantly solving the problems of navigation and ship-handling-and not merely in 
a single ship, but in a whole fleet of them. No modern sailor would dare to explain 
how they did it; the art of sailing such ships is long forgotten. Even then, the achievement 
amazed the French, who looked out in every dawn and saw the sails there. There was 
only a single exception. In heavy westerly gales, they ran for shelter in Plymouth Sound, 
a hundred and fifty miles across the Channel-because in a westerly gale, the French 
could not possibly beat out of harbour. But whenever the wind showed signs of 
moderating, they were back on station before the French could stir.27 
But severe a challenge as the risks of winds, waves, tides and rocks were 
in the days of sail, they challenged, to a very high degree, proficiency in 
seamanship. They did not partake of the same order of inevitable 
destructiveness that would be the result if ships were to engage in a "close-
in" blockade today, when modem-day airborne and submarine radar-
directed, heat-seeking missiles, or other forms of the "smart" weapons of 
contemporary arsenals would doom the enterprise. The destruction wrought 
on H.M.S. Sheffield by an Exocet missile (even though the ship was not engaged 
in any "close-in" blockade) during the 1982 Falklands Conflict illustrates the 
vulnerability of modem warships to even rather obsolescent, cheap and easily 
made post-World War II missile-type weapons. Furthermore, the sad error 
of U.S.S. Vincennes inJuly 1988 underscores the difficulties of command that 
modem weaponry can create. (Although the Vincennes was not involved in 
an official blockade, she was operating in a populous and geographically 
restricted area with busy air and sea lanes. The incident illustrates the 
technological!moral! and social problems with which a commander in a close-
in blockade situation of today would be faced.) Finally, it is suggested that 
a persisting effective blockade, reflecting an adequate ratio of force to both 
space and time, can be achieved without literally complying with the 
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nineteenth and earlier centuries' criterion for effectiveness of being "close-
. " m. 
Again, technology has changed the exercise of the right of visit and search 
quite basically, as McDougal and Feliciano have pointed out regarding the 
present-day difficulties: 
It scarcely needs demonstration to show that the successful exercise of these procedures 
at sea, in the context of modem naval and air warfare, presents the most formidable 
difficulties. The warship attempting to stop, board and search a suspected enemy or 
neutral vessel becomes, in the course of such an attempt, highly vulnerable to air and 
submarine attack. Moreover, the size of present-day ocean carriers and the volume of 
cargo carried make any inspection of the cargo that goes beyond the perfunctory 
examination of shipping manifests practically impossible without modem dock 
facilities.28 
The authors argue, accordingly, that the practice of diverting suspected 
merchantmen to designated control points that has arisen in response to the 
challenge that the foregoing difficulties have posed, is reasonable and hence 
valid. They argue, further, that the same rationale applies to the diversion 
of suspect vessels before or without the formality of a boarding to effect the 
visit and search on the high seas.29 
In comparison, the 1856 Declaration of Paris authoritatively asserted that 
a state, to ensure that its blockade was valid and opposable to neutral ships 
captured as prizes of war for breaching the blockade, was obliged to ensure 
that its blockade was "really effective."3O This obligation was repeated in 
the Declaration of London, 1909,31 which, however, was never ratified by 
Great Britain and never entered into force as a binding instrument for any 
of the states that negotiated it. But a number of countries did evince 
considerable sentiment in favor of its terms, as exemplified, for example, by 
the United States' proposal in August 1914 that the belligerents comply with 
it. The Entente Powers found, on analysis, however, that Germany and 
Austria could import unlimited quantities of foodstuffs and other conditional 
contraband through the neutral state of the Netherlands (which took the view 
that the combination of her declaration of neutrality, together with the 
Convention of Mannheim of 1868 regulating the navigation of the Rhine, 
completely tied her hands). 
On the other hand, article 34 of the Declaration would permit an enemy 
of the United Kingdom to stop all exportation of food from a neutral state 
to that country. Indeed, it was prior to the outbreak of the First World War 
that intense public agitation in Great Britain against, inter alia, article 34, that 
had created so great an opposition to that country's signature, that it resulted 
in the United Kingdom Government's reversal of its position on the 
Declaration and in its refusal to ratify the agreement.32 
This very serious departure by Great Britain and France in their statements 
of policy in August 191433 from the principles of the unratified convention 
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provided Imperial Germany with the basis for her claim to engage in her 
"long distance blockade" by means of indiscriminate submarine warfare, and 
of mining the approaches to the British Isles. The German submarine policies 
were stated to be reprisals against the British and French rejection of the 
1909 Declaration.34 In reality the German submarine logistical strategy, which 
began with a smaller submarine fleet, in 1914, than that of the United Kingdom 
(28 for Germany and 56 for Great Britain) at the outbreak of war,35 never 
ceased, despite the concentration of her naval effort on submarine warfare, 
to be a raiding logistical strategy carried out, even at its height of success 
(March-August 191736) by random attacks that were no better than raiding 
assaults and never could be effectively sustained by maintaining an adequate 
ratio of force to space and time. 
Contrariwise, the Entente Powers, on November 4, 1914, justified their 
long distance blockade, not as a legally permitted logistical strategy, but only 
on the basis of their claim to resort to belligerent reprisals-namely in 
retaliation for Germany's sowing contact mines in the open sea around the 
British Isles contrary to the Hague Mining Convention {Convention VIII).37 
On the other hand, an alternative basis to the questionable one of belligerent 
reprisals might have been supported in terms of an emerging customary rule. 
The case for the Entente Powers' long distance blockade might have been 
argued in terms of the geographical expansion of the blockade owing to 
emerging technological exigencies coupled with a demonstration of its still 
being "truly effective," just as was the "close-in" blockade of the age of 
sail. Such a blockade could be shown to constitute a persisting logistical 
strategy with an adequate ratio of force to space and time. Hence it was 
effective within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the 1856 Paris Convention.38 
(2) The Test of "Effectiveness" 
Although becoming increasingly anachronistic, given changes in weapons 
technology, the test of effectiveness was seen, for example, in the diplomatic 
exchanges during World War I down to April 1917, as a term of art deriving 
from the Paris and other Declarations and international agreements. Hence, 
effectiveness was frequently represented as requiring the positioning of a 
naval force on station, so that it prevented access into and egress from the 
zone (port, estuary, coast, etc.) blockaded. It was out of this requirement, 
in a time before radar, radio, aircraft, and submarines, that the notion 
developed that the test of "effectiveness" could call for a cordon of anchored 
men-of-war. But, as the experience of World War I showed, an effective 
blockade could be maintained at a considerable distance from the enemy's 
ports. For example, the Anglo-American mine barrier across the northern 
end of the North Sea provided as effective a blockade as did the presence 
of the British Grand Fleet in Scapa Flow to bottle up the German High Seas 
Fleet in the Jade River. 
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If conduct which was regarded as impermissible becomes viewed as legally 
permissible, a new regime of customary international law must be shown to 
have come into being; provided that the twin requirements of a constant and 
"uniform usage practiced by the states in question, and that this usage is the 
expression of a right ... "39 are satisfied. In the case of a change in the 
detonations of the qualifier, "effective," such a new customary rule may well 
be justified on the basis of the confrontation of the reality of the new 
technology with traditional law, rendering obsolete the old rule of a close-
in stationing of the blockading fleet. New situations and new weapons, 
through necessity, may be shown to have given rise to new practices that 
still satisfy the requirement of effectiveness, whose connotation remains 
unchanged; that is, it satisfies the requirement of being a persisting holding 
logistical strategy. In these circumstances necessity reinforces the mental 
element of determining the emergence of a customary rule. But, despite the 
resort by both sides in World War I to systems of prohibited zones in which 
neutral merchant ships would be controlled on the British and French side 
by surface forces (with an ever-increasing list of contraband being used to 
justify their seizure) and, on the other, by the threat of being sunk on sight, 
by the end of that war there was no consensus leading to any recognition 
of prohibited maritime zones as lawful. Indeed, a great negative reaction had 
set in, and while the British "Starvation Blockade" was widely denounced 
by publicists (and especially German scholars writing on the subject), the 
German indiscriminate submarine warfare was even more widely stigmatized 
for its ruthless inhumanity. 
The diplomatic interventions of the United States, prior to her declaration 
of war (April 2, 1917) against Germany in World War I, both in terms of 
her suggestions and proposals to both belligerents, and in terms of the 
diplomatic protests she lodged with both sides, are of considerable interest 
in evaluating the possibility of the emergence of a customary international 
norm. It is also germane to arguments that contemporary diplomacy operated 
with a strong negative impact on such a possible development. 
On August 6, 1914, the United States proposed to both of the belligerent 
coalitions that they should adopt the Declaration of London of 1909 as it stood. 
The Entente {in effect Great Britain and France)40 announced that they would 
apply the Declaration, but with very serious departures from it regarding 
conditional contraband. Germany, on the other hand, notified the United 
States on August 22, 1914, that she was willing to apply the Declaration of 
London in its entirety.41 On receipt of these replies the United States protested 
vigorously against the British Order in Council of August 20, 1914. Thus, 
on October 30, 1914, the August 20 Order in Council was cancelled and 
replaced by a further promulgation, making important concessions to the 
United States. But, on December 26, 1914, the United States made a further 
vigorous protest. While these early exchanges did not relate to "long distance 
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blockades" as such, they were soon followed up by United States proposals 
against that form of Allied control of neutral shipping suspected of trading 
with the Central Powers. On December 28, 1914, the United States became 
the spokesman of neutral powers and again protested against the systematic 
enforcement of the diversions of neutral ships which were required by the 
Entente's economic measures. The United States argued that those systematic 
diversions were tantamount to a general presumption that all diverted ships 
were carrying contraband, and that such a presumption was contrary to 
international law. 
Taking advantage of the neutrals' angry reaction to the Entente's system 
of diverting neutral shipping, and the Allies' rejection of the key articles of 
the Declaration of London of 1909 (for example article 34), Germany on 
February 18, 1915, promulgated her first declaration of indiscriminate 
submarine warfare. She claimed that this form of warfare was permissible 
as a reprisal against the Entente's refusal to abide by the Declaration of London 
and their systematic deviation of neutral shipping. She declared that any 
hostile merchant ship encountered in British or Irish waters, including the 
English Channel, would be sunk without warning. Neutral ships navigating 
in those waters were stated to be at risk, on the ground that merchant ships 
of the Entente had, on several occasions, hoisted neutral colors and "mistakes 
could not be avoided. "42 
(3) The Effect of the United States Entry into World War I 
In response to the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare 
in early 1915 the United Kingdom proclaimed the Order in Council of March 
11, 1915 (which was followed by the French decree of March 11, 1915). 
Regarding those promulgations, Guichard tells us that: 
Up to that date indeed France and England had confined their attention to contraband 
alone; from 11th March 1915 they held themselves free to bring into their ports any 
goods the destination, ownership, or origin of which was presumed to be hostile. In 
other words all direct trade between Germany and the Powers overseas was put a stop 
to.43 
Originally, this Order-in-Council was applied only to sea areas east of the 
15th degree east longitude and north of the 30th degree north latitude. 
Subsequently this zone was extended to sea areas east of the 30th degree west 
longitude. In effect, despite British and French insistence to the contrary, they 
had, in effect, created a maritime prohibited zone in relation to neutral vessels 
that they (the Entente Powers) believed to be trading with, or carrying goods 
to and from, the Central Powers.44 Furthermore, they were able to maintain 
this logistical strategy with a persisting ability to hold the area and maintain 
it effectively. 
In March, April, and July 1915 the United States, in effect, charged the 
Entente Powers with illegally interfering with neutral commerce. On 
October 21, 1915, this country protested strongly against the steps that the 
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Entente Powers had taken to interdict neutral trade with the Central 
Powers.45 On July 7, 1916, moreover, the Entente Powers, over France's 
misgivings, abandoned their voluntary acceptance of the principles of the 
Declaration of London. But the period of United States' protests against the 
Entente Powers' blockade ended after her entry, on April 2, 1917, into World 
War 1. Indeed this country brought a much needed, added, strength and 
guiding force to the Allies' blockade. Guichard tells us that: 
The attempts made to bring unity of direction between France. Great Britain and 
Italy had hitherto been unsuccessful .... Unity of direction which France had early 
asked for and which had been so conspicuously lacking was forced upon the allies by 
the economic policy of the United States .... 
. . . . However just about the time that inter-Allied cooperation in the economic war 
really became effective the blockade ceased to occupy the first place in the economic 
anxieties of the Allies. The German counter-blockade ...• [their] achieved unity of 
action ... in respect of maritime transport •... [gave] them victory in the economic 
war.46 
In the period 1914-17, and prior to the United States' entry into World 
War I, the Allied long distance blockade was in an evolving process. During 
that period it was the subject of diplomatic protests by the United States and 
other neutral countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. This latter group, consisting of minor powers having Germany as 
their neighbor, provided an economic protective arc around northern 
Germany. Their economic significance for Germany was greatly enhanced, 
as has already been noted, by the implications of the Declaration of London 
of 1909,47 had the Entente Powers accepted the 1914 United States proposal 
to that effect.48 While they supported the United States' position down to 
April 2, 1917, the Dutch and Scandinavian neutrals negotiated with the Allies 
prior to that date to ameliorate the impact of the blockade upon them in 
consideration for their limiting their exports to Germany. 
In reviewing the relations between the United States and the Entente 
Powers retrospectively from April 2, 1917, and comparing them, 
prospectively, with the United States' attitude after the German Emperor's 
second order of unrestricted submarine warfare on January 19, 1917, it must 
be said that the United States had a complete change of heart regarding the 
matter of the Entente's policy of imposing the long-distance blockade. Just 
prior to April 2, 1917, the United States' attitude toward Germany had been 
exacerbated by the German proposal to Mexico and Japan that they enter 
into an alliance against the United States (published on March 1, 1917).49 With 
regard to the United States' wholehearted and energetic participation in the 
Allies' blockade of Germany and its reflecting a complete change of heart, 
Guichard wrote, regarding earlier American attitudes, "it is of course quite 
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true that in August 1914 the United States had exchanged some very tart notes 
with the Allies on the subject of economic war .... "50 
After April 2, 1917, under the added pressure from the United States, the 
neutral states' adhesion to the Entente's economic policies became a matter 
of increased necessity. In addition, as a result of her economic pressures and 
deprivations, and of her sense of triumph as a result of her imposition of the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on a prostrate Communist Russia,51 Germany 
increased her demands, especially on the Netherlands. This had the result of 
European neutrals becoming more accommodating to the Allied and 
Associated Powers. Indeed, the famous affair of the "Dutch Convoy" in 
April-June 1918 clearly illustrated the Netherlands' acceptance of the Allied 
long distance blockade of Germany then in force.52 The fact of the United 
States' participation in the long-distance blockade was all-important to the 
Netherlands' position. Without it her capacity to resist German demands 
would have been nil. 
c. World War II, 1939-45 
By contrast with the neutral protests, prior to April 2, 1917, against the 
Entente Powers' long distance blockade in World War I, the United States 
did not take a similarly adversarial position with respect to the Allied Powers' 
blockade of Germany in World War II. On the other hand, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union reserved their rights to claim compensation for 
possible future losses due to the Allied Powers' enforcement of their blockade. 
Such possible claims for compensation do not necessarily indicate 
compensation for denials of the other party's rights, but only that the Allies 
should pay for injuries to persons or property incidentally inflicted in the 
exercise of their blockade rights. After some three months into World War 
II, Great Britain and France reinstated what were, in effect, the principles 
of their long-distance blockade of World War I. Thus, after waiting for 
approximately three months, Great Britain promulgated her Order-in-
Council of November 27, 1939.53 Other neutrals, for example, Italy, 
protested.54 After Italy entered the war on June 11, 1940, the system was 
extended to her.55 While the Scandinavian countries also lodged protests early 
in the war, events overcame their positions after Germany invaded and 
occupied Norway and Denmark and effectively held Sweden in a 
hammerlock. 
Again, as in World War I, Great Britain justified her long distance blockade 
as a "retaliatory system." Additionally, in World War II, Great Britain felt 
her position regarding reprisals to be strengthened by the facts of Germany's 
violation of the London (Submarine) Protocol of 1936, her breach of Hague 
Convention VIII on minelaying, and her indiscriminate destruction of 
seaborne commerce between the Allies and neutral states. After Italy's entry 
into the War, Great Britain asserted the same right of reprisal against Italy 
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as against Germany-on the ground of Italy's becoming associated with 
German methods of warfare.56 It should be noted that while British and pro-
British jurists and commentators were already discussing the idea of a long 
distance blockade, and were asserting that "Britain could not be expected 
to fight another war without resort to"57 that form of economic warfare, 
the United Kingdom did not rely on any notion that such a system had emerged 
as a separate category in the customary international law of war. Instead, 
she merely had recourse, once more, to her "retaliatory system." Her caution 
in this regard was, of course, largely due to her uncertainty about the attitudes 
of the United States and the Soviet Union and her policy of not encouraging 
those countries to challenge her system in the name of the freedom of the 
high seas. This delicacy was further motivated by the sobering realization 
of the strength of isolationism in the United States and the violent reversal 
of Soviet foreign policy to a much more pro-German stance, as evidenced 
by the fall of Litvinoff and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact 
of August 1939, the Soviet partition of Poland with Germany, and the Soviet 
seizure of the Baltic States, as an outcome of Joseph Stalin's new pro-German 
orientation. 
In comparing the diplomatic protests served against the Entente Powers 
regarding their long range blockades in Wodd War I with those issued in 
World War II, there would appear to be, quantitatively and qualitatively, 
a considerable decline, on the part of the neutral states, in their resorting 
to this form of resisting or rejecting the Allies' retaliatory system. This raises 
the question of whether decreased reliance on strong diplomatic protests in 
World War II as compared to World War I, may arguably be seen as the 
beginning of an acknowledgment, albeit reluctant, of their decreasing utility 
and necessity. But, again in World War II, as in World War I, the factors 
leading to the emergence of a customary international law norm justifying 
the long-distance blockades were camouflaged by both sides' invocations of 
reprisal as justification for their actions. 
D. Review of Developments Through World Wars I and II, and the Interwar 
Period 
To whatever extent decisions of international tribunals, or of domestic 
tribunals applying international law, have credibility, the decisional law has 
thrown an ambiguous light on the issue of the acceptance of such zones. 
First, it should be noted that the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
did not address the question of blockade by resort to aerial attacks on shipping. 
Aircraft, clearly, have limitations similar to those of submarines regarding 
any capability to visit, search, and seize ships. Possibly this omission could 
be explained by the fact that the Allied forces engaged in this activity to 
a greater extent than did the Axis Powers, largely due to their very much 
greater preponderance in the air.58 
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But the question must be asked whether the fact of non-prosecution at 
Nuremberg for the indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships by aircraft was 
due simply to the fact that the United Nations had themselves engaged in 
this activity in World War II, knowing it to be illegal, and the United Nations 
prosecutors did not wish to have the conduct of their own military planners 
stigmatized as war crimes? Or, alternatively, did they so plan their cases 
because they had felt that long distance blockades had become lawful through 
general practice and acceptance and, further, because such blockades could 
lawfully be enforced by aircraft notwithstanding its limitations with regard 
to ensuring the safety of target ships' papers, passengers, and crews? 
The records of the Nuremberg proceedings regarding prosecution for the 
indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships by submarines to enforce maritime 
prohibited zones as war crimes are instructive. Although Admiral Doenitz 
was charged before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with 
waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the London Naval Treaty 
of 193059 and the 1936 Naval Protocol60 (to which Germany had acceded), 
and although evidence was shown that, on September 3, 1939, the German 
U-boat arm began unrestricted submarine warfare, the Tribunal was not 
prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of that form of submarine 
warfare against British armed merchant ships. In addition, after receiving 
evidence of British unrestricted submarine warfare in a maritime prohibited 
zone which the United Kingdom had established, namely the Skagerrak, 
following a British Admiralty announcement of May 8,1940, and after noting 
Admiral Nimitz's answers to interrogatories which showed that the United 
States Navy had begun unrestricted submarine warfare against the Japanese 
in the Pacific Ocean immediately following the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Tribunal announced that its sentence of 
Doenitz was not assessed on the ground of his "breaches of the international 
law of submarine warfare. "61 Thus the British diplomatic campaign, during 
the inter-War period, to outlaw the type of submarine warfare62 to which 
the German Empire resorted in World War I, was not revived after World 
War II. It should be noted that while the British exclusionary zone in World 
War II was comparatively modest, being constituted by an arm of the North 
Sea, the Skagerrak,63 the United States had declared the whole of the Pacific 
Ocean (one third of the Earth's surface) a prohibited zone in which Japanese 
ships, both naval and mercantile, would be sunk without warning. 
Finally, it should also be noted that some aggravated types of submarine 
attacks on civilian shipping in both World Wars were punished as war crimes. 
But these always involved conduct that was more reprehensible than merely 
that act of sinking the victim ship without warning. The war crimes cases 
arising from both World Wars that spring to mind illustrate the types of 
aggravated circumstances giving rise to the charges. These cases are: 
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(1) The Llandovery Castle (World War 1):64 Submerged submarine U-
boat 82 sank a hospital ship which was distinctly marked as such. The hospital 
ship was not carrying any military personnel other than sick and wounded 
soldiers and members of the Canadian Medical Corps. After torpedoing the 
hospital ship, the submarine's commander, one Patzig, ordered the U-boat 
to surface and, after questioning some of the survivors, fired on the survivQrs 
in lifeboats, massacring many of them. After the War Patzig was not found, 
but two of his officers were arrested, tried and convicted of their war crimes. 
The plea of superior orders was rejected because "killing defenceless people 
in life-boats could be nothing else but a breach of the law;"65 
(2) The Peleus (World War II): The submarine commander ordered the 
massacre by machine-gun fire of the survivors who were clinging to pieces 
of wreckage from the sunken merchant ship;66 
(3) Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle (World War II): As in The Peieus, the 
accused had ordered the massacre of survivors of sunken ships and was 
convicted for that aggravated offense;"67 
(4) Trial of Helmuth von Ruchtesschell (World War II):68 The accused 
was the commander of an armed German surface raider. He was charged 
with committing, inter alia, the following offenses against Allied merchant 
ships: (a) continuing to fire after the target ship had signalled her surrender; 
(b) failure to make provision for the safety of survivors (despite having the 
facilities for taking prisoners on board his ship); and (c) firing at survivors 
in life rafts.69 
E. The Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, 1982 
In each of two conflicts fought in the present decade, namely the Falkland 
Islands Conflict (1982)7° and the Persian Gulf Tanker War (1982-1988),71 both 
sides promulgated Maritime Exclusion Zones. But their various definitions 
and uses have been very different. In the 1982 Falkland Islands Conflict a 
number of exclusion zones (seven in all) were proclaimed. The British 
declarations and the first two Argentinian zones reflected the desire of both 
sides to limit the conflict to the combat forces that they had committed to 
the struggle, to the Islands, and to the seas around them. The British resort 
to maritime exclusion zones was to further their persisting combat strategy 
of retaking and defending the Islands. Their persisting strategy was, in part, 
executed by raiding combat tactics. On the other hand, the Argentinian 
invocation of such zones (except her third, her May 11, 1982, proclamation 
of a "South Atlantic War Zone")72 was for the purpose of reinforcing her 
persisting tactics once her raiding strategy had netted her control over the 
Falkl~nd Islands. This appeared to be a corollary of the claim that each of 
the parties asserted, namely that it was merely exercising its right of self-
defense, and was limiting its use of force to expelling its adversary from the 
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Islands, or to preventing that adversary from permanently establishing its 
territorial sovereignty over them. 
The first British announcement of a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ), took 
effect on April 12, 1982. It established the prohibited area as being two 
hundred nautical miles radius from a point approximately at the center of 
the Falkland Islands. Under this promulgation only Argentine warships and 
naval auxiliaries found within this zone were liable to be attacked.73 On the 
following day Argentina responded by establishing a two hundred sea-mile 
zone off its coast and around the "Malvinas" (Falkland) Islands. Since the 
British fleet was still some distance from the Islands, the effectiveness, for 
the first week or so, of the declaration of the British Maritime Exclusion 
Zone had the effect, as a ruse of war, of reinforcing an unfounded Argentine 
belief that the Royal Naval nuclear submarine H.M.S. Superb was on station 
in the area of Puerto Belgrano and the Falklands. The fact that Superb was 
at Holy Loch, Scotland, at the time may give rise to the question whether 
the British "blockade" complied with the Declaration ofParis.74 On this point 
Professor Levie has commented: 
The British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels 
were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval vessels. It 
was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to Argentine naval forces.75 
On April 23, 1982, the United Kingdom Government informed the 
Argentine Government that: 
Any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries 
or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of 
the British forces in the South Atlantic, will encounter the appropriate response. All 
Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces, 
will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.76 
The zone enunciated in this second declaration has been referred to 
as "The Defensive Bubble." The Royal Navy, the British public and, 
indeed, the world, did not have long to wait to see this proclaimed 
"Defensive Bubble" put into lethal effect. On May 2, 1982, the British 
submarine Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General 
Be/grano some thirty miles outside the MEZ around the Falkland Islands. 
As a result, the British Government experienced some criticism in 
Parliament and in both the domestic and foreign press. In Parliament 
the responsible Minister (Mr. Nott) responded by pointing out that: 
That zone [that is, the MEZ proclaimed on April 12, 1982] is not relevant in this case. 
The "General Belgrano" was attacked under the terms of our warning to the Argentines 
some 10 days previously that any Argentine naval vessel or military aircraft which could 
amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic 
would encounter the appropriate response.77 
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On April 28, 1982 the British Government announced its Total Exclusion 
Zone (TEZ),78 to take effect on April 30, 1982. While occupying the same 
area as the MEZ of April 12, this zone also encompassed "any ... aircraft, 
whether military or civil which is operating in support of the illegal 
occupation" of the Falkland Islands.79 It continued with the further warning 
that: 
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within this zone 
without due authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as 
operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as 
hostile .... 80 
Finally, it should be noted that in all her announcements of the delimitations 
of her specific zones Great Britain still continued to insist that they were 
without prejudice to her general right of self-defense under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. This provided a further legal justification for the 
sinking of the General Belgrano. Criticism of that attack may be further seen 
as paradoxical considering that, at the time of the sinking, the Argentinian 
forces were occupying the Islands and the British forces were forcibly 
attempting to terminate that possession. 
The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense announced an important policy 
statement on May 7,1982, when it said that, because hostile forces "can cover, 
undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, "81 the distances involved 
in resupplying the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands, or take other 
hostile action, "any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found 
more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile. "82 
The Soviet Union, without protesting the creation of an exclusion zone in 
principle, advised the British government that it considered the latest 
statement of policy unlawful, "because it 'arbitrarily proclaim[ed] vast 
expanses of high seas closed to ships and craft of other countries.' "83 On this 
Professor Levie has commented: 
Of course, a blockade always denies the use of part of the high seas to other countries. 
While the Soviet Union might have questioned the extent of the blockaded area as 
excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems little doubt that it was), it 
was a valid blockade under the 1856 Declaration of Paris, to which Russia was one of 
the original parties.54 
On the other hand, if the Soviet criticism is directed against the 
proclamation on the basis of its ineffectiveness due to an insufficient ratio 
of force to space, a point not answered in Professor Levie's comment, it would 
appear to be factually inaccurate. Adequate force appeared to be present 
wherever needed to carry out the enforcement of the British maritime 
exclusion zones for effectuating that country's logistical strategy. 
Furthermore, the area was not so vast as to be unmanageable in fact, and 
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the proclamation appeared to have been enforced by persisting holding, rather 
than raiding, tactics. 
After the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands had surrendered, Great 
Britain lifted the Total Exclusion Zone Ouly 22,1982), but, at the same time, 
asked the Argentine Government (via the Swiss Government) not to allow 
its military aircraft or warships within a zone measuring 150 sea miles radius 
around the Falkland Islands. Similarly Argentina was warned not to allow 
her civil aircraft and shipping within that zone without the prior agreement 
of the British Government. 
In response to the British MEZ on April 8, 1982, Argentina proclaimed 
a similar Maritime Zone, and, on April 29, 1982, it strengthened its MEZ. 
Finally it proclaimed, on May 11,1982, a "South Atlantic War Zone." This 
last declaration has been the occasion of well-known litigation. In Amerada 
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine RepublicS5 the plaintiff corporation sued 
Argentina for the loss of its very large oil tanker Hercules as a result of three 
successive air strikes by Argentine aircraft using bombs and air-to-surface 
missiles. At the time of the attack the Hercules was "about 600 miles off the 
Argentine coast and nearly 500 miles from the Falkland Islands. "86 The court 
added that she was "in international waters, well outside the "exclusion 
zones" declared by the warring parties."87 
While that statement would have been true if it had referred to the British 
zones and those declared by Argentina on April 8 and April 29, 1982, it was 
of doubtful accuracy with regard to Argentina's "South Atlantic War Zone" 
which that country declared on May 11, 1982. It is a valid inference, therefore, 
that the court may have been prepared to recognize Argentina's first two 
declarations as creating valld exclusion zones, but it was not prepared to 
extend that recognition to the vaguely defined "South Atlantic War Zone. "88 
Indeed, this last zone, regardless of the bombing of the Hercules, fails the tests 
of reasonableness, proportionality, clarity of definition, and self-defense. It 
merely proclaimed the basis for a random, raiding logistical strategy. It clearly 
failed to provide for an adequate ratio of power to space and time, and 
amounted to little more than an excuse for conducting indiscriminate attacks 
on neutral shipping, rather than formulating an effective logistical, persisting, 
holding strategy which could be integrated in a sea-keeping assertion of naval 
power utilized for rational ends. 
F. The Persian Gulf "Tanker War" 1980-1988 
Although the Iraq-Iran war began with the border clashes inJune-August 
1980, leading to full-scale land fighting on September 21,1980,89 the Persian 
Gulf Tanker War, as a specific logistical strategy in an array of means and 
methods for conducting hostilities in the Gulf, may be said to have begun 
with the Iraqi declaration on August 12, 1982, of a prohibited war zone 
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at the northern end of the Persian Gulf (north of 29° 03' North). 90 In contrast 
with the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, which took place in an unfrequented 
and secluded part of the world, the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf is one of the 
world's busiest waterways. The original (August 12, 1982) Iraqi prohibited 
war zone contained the northern end of the Gulf. In reality, however, this 
zone was not so much one of exclusion, supported by a persisting logistical 
strategy, as the proclamation of an intention to engage, as opportunities 
offered, in random air raids to inhibit Iranian shipping in the Gulf. 
Subsequently, the zone's area was enlarged so as to include the key Iranian 
oil installations on Kharg Island. In February 1984, this was expanded to 
include a 50-mile radius around Kharg. Until early in 1984 the Iraqis 
concentrated their attacks on ships navigating in the northern zone and 
sailing to and from Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Manshar. But after early 
1984 they concentrated their air strikes on ships sailing to and from Kharg. 
The Iraqi logistical strategy was clear. Like Napoleon's Berlin and Milan 
Decrees against Great Britain (which were directed against British trade and 
that country's ability to wage war and subsidize her allies from her income 
from that trade), the object of the raids was to deny Iran the income she 
needed from oil exports in order to purchase war materiel abroad and, 
generally, defray her costs of waging the war. 
Iran had a similar logistical end in view, namely that of suppressing her 
enemy's trade with third countries which enabled Iraq to earn the money 
needed in order to defray her cost of waging the war. This prevention of 
trade was executed by means of interdicting all and any navigation to and 
from Iraqi ports in the Gulf. But Iraq was able to export her oil, and so defray 
the costs of her belligerency, by pipelines across her western and southern 
neighbors. In addition, Iran also established prohibited zones off the shores 
of Iraq's backers in the war, for example, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates, in the hope of reducing their oil revenues and hence their 
contributions to Iraq's war effort through limiting her purchasing power on 
~he world arms markets. 
Responses to Iranian attacks launched in support of this policy>included 
the United States policy of reflagging Kuwaiti tankers, establishing convoys 
with United States, British, French, and Italian escorts, and bringing the 
issue of the unlawful interference with neutral flag shipping to the attention 
of the Security Council of the United Nations. All these steps did not 
prevent continued Iranian raids on neutral flag tankers. Nor, indeed, did 
the Saudi Arabian proclamation of a 12-mile safety corridor which, since 
it was within the territorial seas of the seven states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, was entitled to belligerent respect, and was intended to provide 
security for neutral shipping-especially the very large tankers carrying 
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oil from Kuwait and from other supporters ofIraq. But this raised no legal 
issues regarding its validity as a maritime zone, since it merely created a 
right-of-way for neutral ships in neutral states' territorial waters. 
The legal issues involving the Iraqi and Iranian exclusion zones, and the 
attacks on shipping therein, depended very largely on the reasons for those 
promulgations. Clearly they were not promulgated, as were the Japanese 
proclamations of 1904 and those of the United States of 1917, for purposes 
of self-defense, nor for the furtherance of persisting or holding strategies. 
They were announced for purposes of inhibiting shipping in the Gulf from 
engaging in the oil export trade of each belligerent's adversaries and their 
supporters by means of random attacks. They reflected offensive raiding 
strategies having only adventitious impacts on possible target shipping. 
Similar to the experience in World Wars I and II, especially early in 
World War I when neutral shipping was attacked, the neutral states 
protested and denounced the attackers. In contrast to those earlier conflicts 
however, it should b~ noted that both Iran and Iraq made neutral ships their 
main targets. Furthermore, Iran not only attacked neutral shipping which 
may have been suspected of earning revenues, either directly or indirectly, 
for Iraq, but also neutral ships when they were navigating between neutral 
ports or even fishing in the Gulf. This, indeed, places the Iranian policy 
well beyond what may possibly be seen as defensible by supporters of an 
emerging customary international law permitting the establishment of 
effective exclusionary zones maintained persistently by an adequate ratio 
of power to space and time. Even when satisfying these criteria, such a 
zone may be lawful only if it is, comparatively speaking, maintained 
effectively and complies with the rule of reasonableness. It may not provide 
an excuse for a raiding strategy directed randomly against any or all non-
Iranian shipping found in the Zone without regard to their nationality or 
to their purpose for being in the Zone. 
There is a further consideration: Although the belligerents have not been 
subjected to the severe and hostile criticism that may have been expected, 
or that was the experience of the belligerents in World War I, the neutral 
states' muted outrage may not be due to their tacit acceptance of a new 
customary rule exposing them to random, raiding attacks. Rather, their 
relative silence may be attributed to the fact that the very large tanker surplus 
fleet (and threat of an oil surplus as well) and the favorable conditions of 
insurance in the 1980's rendered such attacks relatively less unacceptable to 
the tanker fleets' owners than did such attacks during the World Wars, when 
they resulted in a great scarcity both of shipping and of the cargoes those 
sunken ships had carried. 
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III. Review of Some Relevant Concepts Relating 
to the Emergence of Customary 
Principles of International Law 
Governing the Establishment of Maritime Exclusion 
Zones in the Context of the 
Resort to the Use of Force 
A. Custom and the Emergence of Belligerent Maritime Usages and Obligatory 
Rules 
Customary international law is formed from a combination of ·"a constant 
and uniform usage practised by the States in question"91 and the essential 
psychological element of opinio juris sive necessitatis.92 Because, for so long 
maritime states have stressed, as fundamental to their survival, the freedom 
of the high seas, belligerents' claims to enforce maritime exclusion zones must 
be carefully balanced against the traditional and basal doctrine and the 
interests interpreting it. Assertions that the power to create such zones has 
emerged into customary international law demand rigorous criteria for 
justifying their promulgation by warring states. Indeed, a. case-by-case 
approach is required. On the other hand, it should be observed that the 
creation of such zones has arisen, in part, from the development and 
deployment of new weapons, from the evolution of new tactics, and from 
the emergence of economic warfare as an important, indeed essential, 
weapon. Thus, they have been resorted to for the purposes of both combat 
and logistical strategies. 
The dual essentials of usage and the actor's belief in the right or necessity 
of acting in the prescribed manner hold equal sway as criteria for determining 
the emergence of a customary law doctrine orprivilege.93 Furthermore, when 
these are consistent with the fundamental right of self-defense, and satisfy 
the rule of reasonableness, their potential interference with a neutral state's 
traditional rights under the freedom of the high seas may be justified. On 
the other hand, if they are implemented by raiding strategies, even if for the 
purpose of self-defense and even if they may satisfy the criteria of 
proportionality and the rule of reasonableness, they may not, ceteris paribus, 
be justifiable. Customary international law cannot recognize a belligerent 
right which is ineffective and which permits an actor to fail to lay an even 
hand on those regarding whom it has the right or privilege of imposing its 
regime. Thus a maritime exclusion zone which is only enforced sporadically 
or randomly merely by, raiding tactics should not be seen as entitled to 
recognition as lawful under customary international law. 
The practice of declaring maritime war zones or exclusion zones arose, 
as Professor Stone has pointed out, from the necessities of the situation 
confronting, not only the United Kingdom, as Stone argues, but Germany 
as well. The reliance by both sides on invoking belligerent reprisals 
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camouflaged the "long term transformation of the traditional laws of 
blockade. "94 The question, however, remains, what values apply to legitimate 
that transformation and what values will reject either or both claims to 
validity? It is, furthermore, a thesis of this paper, that these two disparate 
types of war zones are not utilized symmetrically. Indeed, while the former 
is based on an effective persisting holding logistical strategy the latter is based 
on a raiding logistical strategy. In contrast with positions such as those taken 
by Stone or Fenrick, this paper views these unlike devices in aid of strategy 
as not being entitled to be treated as alike juridically. Indiscriminate sinkings 
of merchant ships by the U-boat arm as the main means of pursuing a raiding 
logistical strategy cannot claim to fit under justifications which may uphold 
the legality of the persisting logistical strategies reflected in the Long Distance 
Blockades by, respectively, the Entente Powers (in World War I) and the 
United Nations (in World War II). The two modes of waging economic war 
and the strategies by which they were pursued were so different that it would 
be absurd to invoke arguments and evidences justifying the latter to validate 
the former. 
Necessity is also reflected in the changed circumstances of modern 
economic warfare. Technological change, in the form of the ever-increasing 
destructiveness of modern weaponry, has created new challenges for the 
international law of armed conflict. Furthermore, the strategic challenges 
presented by the contemporary development of advanced nations' economic 
infrastructures have called for new responses in terms of economic warfare 
which, in turn, have created new challenges for the international 
humanitarian law relevant to their deployment and use. When the rules of 
blockade were first evolved, most European states relied quite heavily on the 
coastal maritime transportation of their goods, even for domestic and internal 
trade. At that time contraband and blockade control was relatively simple 
because goods would pass from port to port by sea and their destination would 
be revealed by their movement even if transshipments were involved. Today 
most states, even such states as Iraq and Argentina, have extensive waterways 
and railways for internal and international transportation. By rail Iran can 
be supplied from the Soviet Union and by highways from China and Pakistan. 
Writing of such an expansion of states' economic infrastructure as this factor 
existed back in the time of World War II, Julius Stone wrote: 
The expansion of alternative rail and inland waterway transport facilities, with which 
Germany was superlatively endowed, transformed this situation. "The conditions of 
modern commerce offer almost infinite opportunities for concealing the real nature of 
a transaction, and every device which the ingenuity of the persons concerned or their 
lawyers could suggest has been employed to give shipments intended for Germany the 
appearance of genuine transactions with a neutral country."95 
B. "Necessity" in the Formation of Customary International Law 
While some writers% tend to denigrate the role of "historical" or "social" 
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"necessity" as a possible alternative, or additional, element of opinio juris, the 
argument here is that changes in the technological and social infrastructure 
of a social relationship operate to bring about legal change, not so much under 
the rubric of opinio juris, as under that of its disjunctive97 clause sive necessitatis. 
This disjunctive meaning would appear to be inherent (but to most writers 
latently so) in the traditional Latin formulation. 
The second step, in reviewing the relevance of the criteria for determining 
the incremental effect on legal change of the technological and socio-
economic substratum, is to observe that an emerging custom may tend to 
displace existing rights assured under international law. For example, the 
continental shelf doctrine was criticized, in its early years, as potentially 
displacing the traditional, and entrenched, freedom of the high seas-for 
example, the traditional rights of trawling, dredging and anchoring anywhere 
beyond states' territorial seas. Thus, Professor Humphrey Waldock, later 
President of the International Court of Justice, observed, on April 5, 1950, 
that: "[ t ]he suggested new doctrine of the continental shelfis not merely novel 
but involves a reversal of existing customary [international] law. "98 But this 
consideration did not prevent Waldock from arguing in favor of recognizing 
that now popularly accepted, but then emerging, doctrine as customary 
international law. 
Even more significantly, and regardless of the strategies involved (i.e., 
persisting and hence "effective", or raiding, and hence, random and thus 
proportionately ineffective), the recognition of states' claims to establish 
Maritime Exclusionary Zones as lawful will always necessarily be effectuated 
at the expense of freedom of the high seas for all navigation including, to 
the extent necessity may limit them, the rights of neutral traders. In this 
regard, of course, belligerent maritime war zones, or exclusionary zones, 
which are usually intended to last the duration of the conflict, are t9 be 
distinguished from the usually more transient, maritime exclusion zones that 
states establish for bombing and gunnery exercises in times of peace. They 
(i.e., belligerent maritime exclusion zones) are also to be distinguished from 
those maritime zones which states announce for the testing of nuclear devices 
and weapons. These, with perhaps one exception, that of France99 in recent 
years, have been predicated, not on an enclosure of an area of the oceans, 
but on the principle of a "Warning to Mariners." This device simply notifies 
aircraft and ships proposing to use the area of the dangers to them attending 
the notifying state's exercise of its own freedom of the high seas. It should 
be stressed, in this context, that such warnings may be brief, or may remain 
in place for indefinite periods of time. lOO Clearly, the task of establishing the 
emergence of a customary rule permitting belligerent states to impair, if not 
eliminate, the rights of neutrals to enjoy the freedom of the high seas is far 
more burdensome than defending the privilege of states, in the pursuit of their 
national security interests, to create temporary dangers for shipping in limited 
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sea areas, by testing weapons on the high seas or engaging in bombing and 
gunnery practice and by issuing warnings to others of the presence of those 
dangers. 
C. The Legal Significance of Diplomatic Protest as an Inhibiting Factor in the 
Formation of a Customary Norm . 
Diplomatic protest has been seen as an inhibitor of custom, and writers 
have suggested that its absence can be strong evidence of acquiescence to a 
change in customary international law and, hence, to the emergence of a new 
norm supplanting and negating the old.t°l But, as D'Amato points out, states 
"do not issue notes of protest to the actions of other states that they regard 
as illegal under international law, " and argues that "[£]oreign offices which 
did so would have little time for anything else. "102 He also maintains the 
interesting thesis that reliance on this procedure as a factor in the making 
or the restraining of the formation of customary international law is too 
narrow and more restrictive than necessary for the recognition and validation 
of new rules. He points out, on the contrary, that the sources and the flow 
of decisions in the process of forming a new customary norm of international 
law is much more flexible and pluralistic. He states, and this writer agrees 
fully with his argument, that: 
This diplomacy is usually conducted verbally by ambassadors, representatives, consuls, 
visiting businessmen, and so forth. The range of negotiating tactics is quite vast, including 
threats to corporate assets of the other country's nationals that are located in the 
complaining state, retaliation by raising tariff barriers, reduce foreign economic or 
military aid to the target state or its allies or dependents, support another country's 
hostility to the target state, vote against the target state in the United Nations, and 
related threats or warnings.103 
The fact that the United States, the major protesting state against the 
creation of prohibited zones (or war zones) in both W orld Wars, embraced 
the policy of creating them after becoming a participant in both, tends greatly 
to undermine the significance of both sets of her protests. In any event, and, 
in addition, following the principle that" actions speak louder than words, "104 
the United States' affirmative policy regarding maritime exclusion (war) 
zones after she became a belligerent should carry more weight than her 
previously published protests as a neutral. It should be noted, too, that in 
World War II, while neutrals such as the Netherlands and Norway regarded 
the British resort to maritime exclusion zones as contrary to international 
law down to May 1940, thereafter these two countries, through their 
governments-in-exile, supported such zones, as did the United States after 
its entry into W odd War II. in light of the subsequent conduct of the states 
that engaged most vociferously in voicing their diplomatic protests against 
the declaration of maritime exclusion zones, the conclusion may be drawn 
that the diplomatic protests lodged against the declaration and enforcement 
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of exclusion zones established by the Entente Powers in W arid War I as well 
as the United Nations in WorId War II are of dubious efficacy and carry 
little or no weight in restraining the emergence of a customary international 
law norm legitimizing maritime exclusion zones. This is the case despite the 
fact that these regimes in their various forms, encroach upon the doctrine 
of freedom of the high seas and despite their effect of curtailing the traditional 
rights and immunities of neutrals. 
With regard to the diplomatic reaction to the British Total Exclusionary 
Zone of April 30, 1982, the Soviet Union, as has been noted,105 took a critical 
stance. But, because the Soviet Union was the only non-belligerent that 
complained about the TEZ and, furthermore, because the British did not 
attack any neutral ships within the zone, it would appear that most interested 
states acquiesced in it as reasonable. Nor did the Soviet Union have any more 
than a theoretical basis for its academic comment. That is, she engaged in 
the relatively unusual, according to Professor D'Amato, act of protesting 
without being injured and on the basis; merely, of a theoretical disagreement 
with the British announcement.106 The Soviet Union had received no injury 
in fact, and hence the basis for its diplomatic protest may be questionable. 
Finally, because the Soviet Union's mode of characterizing the zone did not 
accurately reflect the British policy of ensuring safeguards for neutrals,l07 the 
Soviets' protest cannot be regarded as having significantly effective validity 
in restraining the emergence of customary international law norms on the 
subject. 
IV. Customary Law and the Usages of War: 
the Substratum of Modification and The 
Relevance of Military Utility 
A. Relativism, Military Economy108 and the Role of Law 
The Romans may have believed the maxim inter arma silent leges, but today, 
unless a contest becomes "absolute"l09 in the Clausewitzian sense or "total" 
in the nuclear holocaust sense, there are, necessarily, areas of common interest 
where the principles of humanity, reciprocity and utility have important 
functions. In addition, as has already been observed, the value of military 
economy,110 which provides the sound basis for planning any campaign, gives 
rise to a second development, namely the mutual respect of common restraints 
as a matter of common interest. In his defense of the utility of international 
law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht pointed out: 
At the same time, in view of the humanitarian character of a substantial part of the 
rules of war it is imperative that during the war these rules should be mutually observed 
regardless of the legality of the war. For it is these rules which, on the whole, have 
been generally observed in the past-for the reason perhaps that they do not seriously 
interfere with the achievement of the major purpose of the war.l11 
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Indeed, building upon Lauterpacht's thesis, it is possible to say that in all 
wars, except those that Clausewitz identified as "absolute" (and considered, 
in the pre-nuclear age in which he lived, to be impossible to wage112), the 
interest of both or all belligerents is that rules which temper the ferocity of 
waging war, and especially those that confer a benefit in terms of military 
economy, should be observed. This prudential economy of force is not so much 
a matter of a warrior's self-image as being sans peur et sans reproche, as of military 
utility and each belligerent's self-interest in expending the minimum of force 
for achieving the object of the contest and of maintaining a reserve of force 
to meet further contingencies.1l3 Furthermore, Clausewitz accepted the fact 
that the inherent "frictions,"114 "checks," and "modifications" inherent in 
"the apparatus of War," and "the non-conducting medium which hinders 
the complete discharge"115 of belligerent powers (energy), acted as restraints 
on focusing the complete direction of energy, without any diffusion, onto 
the object of the war itself. In addition, in our own day, we have come to 
call, not for the "utmost use of force, ':116 but "limited" applications of force 
in the sense that the whole power of the state is not concentrated into an 
all-consuming effort of will to which all other considerations are 
subordinated. For it is highly probable (or well-nigh inevitable) that the more 
intense becomes the focus of the will to win the greater will be the temptations 
to flout relevant rules of international law, especially if these are perceived 
as restraints on the will to victory. While soldiers and statesmen are mistaken 
in perceiving the rules of international law as adding to Clausewitz's "non-
conducting medium" acting as a restraint on the complete direction of energy, 
the possibility of their doing so may render the atmosphere of all-out effort 
inimical to the observation of lawful conduct. 
B. Limited War: When Militarily Viable and, at the Same Time, Receptive of 
Humanitarian Law 
Von Clausewitz tells us that political ends may decree that a precise balance 
should be struck between means and ends.ll7 While not resorting to the "utmost 
use of force," a country waging a limited war must yet master its enemy within 
the limiting frame of that type of warfare. The commander should act "to a 
certain extent upon the principle of only applying so much force and aiming 
at such an object in War as is just sufficient for the attainment of its political 
object. "118 Experience also illustrates this point. For example, Professor Levie 
has pointed out that the 1982 Falkland Islands Conflict provided an example 
in which the fighting was kept within bounds so that the future of the laws 
of war, having the traditional effect of temperamenta belli, remained quite bright, 
since in that conflict, the localization of the hostilities, which was assisted by 
the proclamations of six of the seven exclusion zones, kept the war "a 
gentlemen's war".119 A geographically more diffuse conduct of the hostilities 
would have led to much more violent and destructive operations, indeed to those 
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political frenzies which undermine the will to observe the laws of war in an 
obsessive determination to triumph at all costs. 
The thesis presented here is that, first, we should view the intensity of the 
war in which the issues of legality arise as a possible variable influencing the 
willingness of each of the combatants to see its own interest in abiding by the 
rules of war. Thus, for example, as Professor Levie tells us, a limited war at 
sea may be one in which the rules of war are observed and developed by new 
conditions. But some wars, for example such wars of national liberation as the 
Algerian revolt against French colonial rule, were, at least according to some 
writers, limited wars, yet were redolent with inhumane excesses. Thus a 
military commander present in Algeria during the uprising there that led 
eventually to independence, and who had a crucial counter-insurgency role to 
play, has confirmed that such wars are not, and cannot, of their nature be, 
"gentlemen's wars," but ones of terrorism, widespread atrocities and genocide. 
Those crimes were not (in the Algerian context) committed so much on the 
part of the incumbent government, which usually had to work under the eyes 
of the press, television news and the public, but rather by the insurgent groups. 
Thus, that officer (the author Roger Trinquier) wrote: 
In the month of September 1958, the forces of order took possession of the flIes of a 
military tribunal of one of the regions of the F.L.N. In the canton of Michelet alone, 
in the arrondissement (district) of Fort-National in Kabylie more than 2,000 inhabitants 
were condemned to death and executed between November 1, 1954 and April 17, 1957.120 
In many wars, be they the "total" wars as exemplified by the two World 
Wars, or certain "local wars" such as, for example, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988), or wars in which terroristic insurgencies pit themselves against 
incumbent regimes, the parties' adherences to the laws of war become 
subordinated to their all-absorbing, indeed obsessive, struggle for survival. 
But in between the two extremes of "gentlemen's" limited wars on the one 
hand, and the self-imposed limitations of an incumbent regime in its fight 
against terrorism on the other, there do exist, owing to a possibly prevailing 
political climate between the adversaries, considerations for statesmen who 
see beyond the conflict itself to the post-war settlements. When such a 
prudential far-sightedness prevails, wars may be waged in truly limited modes 
and are subjected by their participants to the governance of the laws and 
usages of war. Of these the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-04 and the 1982 Falklands Conflict provide practical models. 
C. Emergence of the Maritime Exclusion Zones as Customary Law: A Matter 
of Contexts 
(1) General Recapitulation 
At the outset of this chapter the presentation was in terms of the emergence 
of maritime exclusion zones in the context of the famous long distance 
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blockades of World Wars I and II. These were reviewed in terms of the 
distinct, but frequently overlapping, criteria of defensive versus offensive 
objectives and of persisting versus raiding combat or logistical strategies and 
tactics. The survey of these regimes began with the Japanese defense zones 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the United States defense zones 
which were established in April 1917 on the model of the earlier Japanese 
zones. While those defense zones may be regarded as having the status of 
accepted custom, the more controversial long-distance blockading, prohibited 
maritime zones or logistical strategies may not yet appear to have received 
unqualified, universal endorsement of legality. But, subject to the test of 
proportionality and reasonableness, and especially when created for purposes 
of maintaining a persisting logistical strategy supported by an adequate ratio 
of force to time and space, they may appear to be moving conditionally into 
the light of recognition as customary international law. Writing in 1952, Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht stated: 
[M]easures regularly and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the form of reprisals 
and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing belligerent must be regarded as 
a development of the latent principle of the law of blockade, namely, that the belligerent 
who possesses the effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his opponent of 
the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own vessels or conveying 
on neutral vessels such goods as are destined to or originate from him.121 
In contradistinction from Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's thesis, the argument in 
this chapter is that, for the evolution of an even-handed, predictable system 
governing exclusion zones, it is necessary for scholars to be discriminating; 
otherwise a Panglossian position could evolve which merely states that the 
commander of the sea may dictate, merely by virtue of his power, what the 
law allows. Furthermore, the phrase "commander of the sea" is ambiguous. 
In World War I Great Britain held undisputed command of the surface of 
the sea. Yet this command did not command Germany's indiscriminate 
submarine warfare. After the United States entered the war new 
developments, as well as a far greater concentration of naval forces, narrowly 
defeated that almost overwhelming threat. Thus, the issue of legality should 
be tested by more discriminating criteria than upholding the strategies that 
combatants may view as necessary for their belligerent successes. 
Aspects from the considerations already stressed reveal that due regard 
must always be had for the principles of humanity, proportionality, 
reciprocity, and utility. Humanitarian law imposes its standards, and they may 
be most effective when they can be shown to combine with the principle 
of military economy to moderate the ferocity of fighting's side effects and 
limit the violence of war's impact upon those drawn into its vortex. 
(2) Exclusion Zones as Facultative Instruments 
The point has already been made that Admiral Doenitz was not found guilty 
of the charges which arose from his orders to the German U-boat arm to 
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engage in unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the London Navy 
Treaty of 1930 and the 1936 Naval Protocol. This decision was ambiguously 
reached, as to principle, after the Tribunal had received evidence of British 
and United States methods of waging unrestricted submarine warfare, 
respectively, in the Skagerrak and the Pacific Ocean.l22 A distinction should 
be drawn, however, between the British maritime exclusion zone (namely 
of the Skaggerak) and that proclaimed by the United States. This latter zone 
consisted of the whole Pacific Ocean. The question thus becomes one of 
reviewing Maritime Exclusion Zones in terms of both the strategies they 
facilitate and of the values they promote. 
(a) The Exclusion Zone of the Skaggerak 
The Skaggerak is an arm of the North Sea on its eastern side and lies 
between Denmark and Norway. It is some 150 nautical miles in length and 
85 miles in width. 123 By contrast with this relatively restricted area, the Pacific 
Ocean covers approximately one-third of the Earth's surface. While both 
declarations may be found to be legally supportable, a basic distinction should 
be made between the grounds of their respective justifications. The argument 
vindicating the British proclamation of the Skaggerak as a maritime exclusion 
zone under emerging customary international law may be accepted, since the 
strategy for enforcing the exclusion of the adversary from the zone was an 
apparently successful one. It was a persisting logistical strategy enforced by 
both aircraft and submarines providing an adequate ratio of force to space. 
This proposition can be analyzed out into the following elements. 
(i) The zone was reasonable in area, and despite German surface naval 
power, the logistical strategy was persistently maintained and was made 
effective through submarine and aerial warfare; 
(ii) The object, while not primarily one of self-defense, was for the related 
purposes of: 
(a) Hampering the German utilization of Norwegian territory as a 
base for attacking the British Isles and North Atlantic convoys (including, 
of course, those going to Murmansk with aid for Russia); 
(b) encumbering Germany's reinforcements and supplies destined for 
its oppressive occupation of Norway-a victim of Nazi aggression; 
(c) the target shipping had military objectives and purposes and could 
not be viewed as carrying supplies which had the object of benefitting the 
civilian population of Norway; and 
(d) the ratio of the area to the force deployed was proportional to 
the military objective in hand. 
(b) The Pacific Exclusion Zone 
By contrast with the Skaggerak, the Pacific Ocean, the world's largest, 
has an area of 69,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Arctic Circle 
to Antarctica.124 An announcement of indiscriminate sinking by submarines 
in such a vast area may not, it is suggested, reasonably be regarded as the 
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enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone, except by a naval service many 
times larger than the enormous force that the United States Navy deployed 
there. It is believed, furthermore, that the adjunct of a continuing presence 
of air power would have been a necessary adjunct for ensuring an effective 
persisting logistical strategy. For one thing, in so vast an area a submarine 
fleet of almost any size, on its own, cannot satisfy the requirement of 
"effectiveness. " The sinking of ships thus becomes contingent on the presence, 
coincidentally, of a target ship and targeting submarine in proximity to one 
another. 
Alternatively, as the case of the United States submarine service's 
operations in the Pacific illustrated, these coincidences tended to concentrate, 
before the liberation of the Philippines, in Philippine and Japanese home 
waters. Accordingly, although the United States Navy identified the whole 
Pacific as the exclusion zone, in fact the areas of actual attack tended to be 
where concentrations of Japanese shipping were to be found and where the 
submarines were ordered. Hence, in the zones of actual combat there was 
an adequate ratio of force to space and time. But the space so treated was 
far smaller than the Pacific Ocean. 
Of course, strategic and intelligence issues created an advantage in leaving 
the defined zone as the larger area, since the element of surprise, which 
provides the submarine with its single most important asset, could be lost 
if, as the war progressed, different, more limited, and more proportionate 
exclusion zones were progressively announced as the Allied Forces 
approached the Japanese home islands. In effect, in the smaller sea areas where 
submarine tactics were effective, persisting logistical tactics maintained the 
necessary effective pressure on Japanese shipping; but the raiding strategy 
on which this mode of warfare was founded, by reason of the extent of the 
maritime prohibited zone, did not provide effectiveness. 
On the other hand, while strategic convenience and utility may call for 
the announcement of the larger area, the legal rule of reasonableness does 
not reinforce the strategic consideration, since it is not reasonable to expect 
an effective enforcement, at all points of the Pacific Ocean, of the prohibition 
to shipping indicated in the proclamation or enunciation of such a zone. 
Rather, the U.S. submarines, like the German wolf-packs in the North 
Atlantic, tended to resemble more the "corsair" type of traditional maritime 
warfare (with the difference, of course, that the submarines were regular 
naval units, not privateers) rather than the enforcement of a specific maritime 
exclusion zone. On the other hand, while such an announcement as that of 
Admiral Nimitz of the vast maritime exclusion zone, which in itself was 
tantamount to a hunting license in the conduct of a raiding strategy, may 
not have found justification under any emerging customary norm-being 
more an analogy to a policy of worldwide indiscriminate submarine warfare 
than to the creation of a lawful maritime exclusion zone. 
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The United States Navy's submarine strategy may, alternatively, be 
justified as a reprisal against the Japanese methods of waging war, from the 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, to that country's 
inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and of civilian internees caught under 
their occupation and, hence, not participating, pro tanto, in the emergence of 
a customary norm of international law. In addition, it should be noted, the 
Japanese, on their part, waged an inhumane and indiscriminate, even if 
relatively ineffective and militarily inept, submarine warfare on their own 
part. This mode of warfare on the part of Japan clearly marked, despite its 
relative ineffectiveness, the reprisals the United States Navy enforced by the 
submarine arm. Thus, the surprise advantage accorded by the vastness of the 
Pacific Ocean, which might be seen as negating the reasonableness of the 
United States declaration under an emerging rule of customary international 
law, may not be abrogated. It should instead properly be justified under the 
law of belligerent reprisals rather than as participating in the emergence of 
a customary norm of international law permitting states, who comply with 
the necessary criteria, to establish maritime exclusion zones. 
Again, the "exclusion zones" created by Iran and Iraq do not seem to have 
been relevant to those countries' attacks on each other's shipping or to attacks 
that they made on the shipping of third (neutral) parties. With regard to the 
Falklands Conflict, in light of the above argument it is believed that the 
exclusion zones established by both sides, including the "British Bubble," but 
excluding the last of the Argentine proclamations, namely of the "South 
Atlantic War Zone" on May 11,1982, were valid, and testify to the emergence 
of the relevant customary norm. That last Argentine proclamation was both 
vague as to area, and random, and hence militarily ineffective, as to 
enforcement. Accordingly, it should be found to have failed in the test of 
reasonableness. Indeed, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit pointed out in the Amerada Hess casel25 the sinking of the Hercules was 
an international wrong. In reaching this conclusion, the court ignored 
(correctly, it is suggested) any relevance that the Argentinian Declaration 
of the "South Atlantic War Zone" might have had as a justification, had it 
not resulted in a randomly chosen raiding action. 
While, perhaps, the view already quoted from Professor Lauterpacht, and 
reiterated by Professor Julius Stonel26 may be overbroadly permissive, the 
opposing thesis recently expressed by Ross Leckow that "the implementation 
of war zones can be justified only in very restricted circumstances . . . "127 
and his restricted condonation of resort to this device in terms of 
"reasonableness"l28 is not supported without a necessary spelling out of the 
meaning of the word in terms of strategies and goals, and in terms of means 
and methods relative to those strategies and goals. 
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V. Summary Conclusion 
At the present time, more than in Clausewitz's day, war has taken on a 
chameleon-like character. It now depends on politics both as to means and 
to ends. Thus law necessarily must adjust to the variable social and ideological 
substrata upon which its pursuit depends in all their protean forms. 
Accordingly, while the following quotation from the late Professor Julius 
Stone's magisterial work on the regulation and control of conflict situations 
is seen as uttering an important insight, it should be treated as an invitation 
to rethink the emerging rules, and to treat states' conduct in the area, and 
the consecration of allegedly emerging rules with discriminatory reservation, 
rather than the undiscriminating proposal of a new norm of customary 
intemationallaw covering most, if not all, of the relevant situations. Stone 
eloquently and perhaps even cogently wrote: 
It is idle to seek to reduce this matter to a en de coeur of humanity. War law, even 
at its most merciful, is no expression of sheer humanity, save as adjusted to the exigencies 
of military success, a truth as bitter (but no less true) about attacks on merchant ships, 
as about target area saturation bombing. And it is also quite idle for Powers whose 
naval supremacy in surface craft enables them to pursue the aim of annihilating the 
enemy's seaborne commerce without "sink at sight" warfare, to expect that States which 
cannot aspire to such supremacy will refrain from seeking to annihilate that commerce 
by such naval means available to them as submarines, aircraft and mines. To refuse to 
face this will save neither life nor ship in any future war; and it will also forestall the 
growth of real rules for the mitigation and suffering under modem conditions.I29 
Stone's observation about practicalities and expectations is without doubt 
correct. The experience of two World Wars tells that legal change in the 
direction towards which the late Professor Stone points is becoming 
crystallized. On the other hand, while the insight and direction of the 
quotation reflects contemporary needs, it tells us little about testing the 
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable formulations for declaring 
maritime exclusion zones and resorting to submarine warfare to enforce them. 
The preceding pages have sought to foreshadow and examine 
discriminating tests for determining whether a maritime prohibited zone is 
entitled to deference and compliance, as being lawful, or whether it should 
be resisted by third parties as unlawful. It is now useful to analyze and subsume 
models of the types of maritime prohibited zones that have been met in history, 
including very recent history, under the heads that have been developed in 
terms of goals and strategies. But before that analysis is presented, a general 
point should be made: while circumstances may dictate whether or not 
publicity, and the giving of a timely notice, may, or may not, be to the 
strategic advantage of a belligerent (as for example it was clearly so in the 
case of the British Falkland Islands proclamation that took effect on April 
12, 1982130), publicity is clearly a necessary precondition for the legal validity 
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of every exclusion zone. In this context, Fenrick has correctly argued that 
the declaring state should: 
[P]ublicly declare the existence, location and duration of the zone, what is excluded 
from the zone, and the sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the 
zone without permission, and also to provide enough lead time before the zone comes 
into effect to allow ships to clear the area.13I 
This paper will now summarize and review the arguments that have been 
developed in terms of ends and means, goals, strategies and methods, and 
tactics in resorting to maritime prohibited zones as instruments of waging 
war. 
A. Defensive Goals and Persisting Logistical Strategies 
First, it is suggested that purely defensive zones of reasonably limited 
extent, regarding which a timely and public notice to all affected ships and 
aircraft has been given, for example those established by Japan in the Russo-
Japanese War, 1904-05 and by the United States in 1917,132 have always been 
acceptable to other maritime powers, even though they did trespass onto the 
high seas as then delimited. Despite their far greater extent than those of 
1904 and 1917, the British and Argentinian exclusion zones (except for that 
latter country's last proclamation of such a zone which sought to constitute 
the South Atlantic Ocean as a maritime prohibited zone) in the Falkland 
Islands Conflict of 1982, were lawful on the same grounds.133 These may, 
accordingly, be justified on the basis of the publicity of their announcement, 
the specificity of their delineation, the fact that adequate time was given for 
affected shipping to quit the area, and the restraint (and proportionality) 
exercised in the enforcement.134 Furthermore, after the arrival of the 
expeditionary force, the British zones reflected a defensive strategy 
(although, necessarily, they were part of their proponent's attacking tactics), 
were logistically persistent and involved an adequate ratio of force to space 
and time. Hence they also satisfied the traditional, but still prevailing, 
customary international law rule which requires effectiveness,135 
proportionality, reasonableness and, so far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, appropriateness for advancing that country's lawful purpose, 
namely compliance of both sides with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 502.136 
At this point it may be noted in passing that "Operation Market Time," 
which was enforced by the United States Navy during the Vietnamese War 
was legally valid since it was a law-enforcement operation limited to a 
distance of twelve miles from the low water mark of South Vietnam (it did 
not extend north beyond the DMZ) and so within the domestic competence 
of South Vietnam, which legislated to empower the activity. Since that 
operation was conducted entirely within the territorial sea and contiguous 
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zone of South Vietnam, it does not come within the perspective of the present 
paper.137 Similarly, the blockade of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese 
ports was justified in the Naval Commander's Handbook as being "in conformity 
with traditional criteria ... , "138 and should not be regarded as falling within 
the emerging concept of maritime prohibited zones, but rather of the 
traditional notions of blockade. 
B. Defensive Goals Expressed in Raiding Logistical Strategies and Tactics 
The establishment of unacceptable and hence invalid maritime defensive 
zones for the purpose of warning an enemy that shipping could be attacked 
without further warning, but which cannot be consistently sustained, was 
exemplified by all three of the Argentinian proclamations. Apart from 
Security Council Resolution 502,139 which declared Argentine presence in the 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) to be unlawful, the first two Argentine 
proclamations may be viewed as lawful in terms of jus in bello in 
contradistinction to any reference to arguments in terms of jus ad bellum. But 
that country's third legally indeterminate and ineffective proclamation of 
May 11, 1982, failed to comply with any criteria of validity.140 On the other 
hand, it appeared that none of the three could be sustained by a persisting 
logistical strategy, so that, on the basis of effectiveness in terms of an adequate 
ratio of force to space and time, they all become questionable as only being 
sustained by raiding tactics. These tactics, and the strategy from which they 
were derived, are no more than the exploitation of the forces' nuisance value. 
While causing loss of life and supplies, they were too sporadic to affect the 
adversary's will, or the outcome of the contest. The criticism, in earlier 
paragraphs, of the United States' establishment of the Pacific Ocean as a 
maritime zone from which Japanese shipping was purported to be excluded 
during World War iI, reflects the non-validating combination of the criteria 
of defensive goals expressed through logistical raiding strategies and tactics. 
c. Aggressive Goals and Persisting Strategies 
In the Indo-Pakistan War the Indian Navy established an exclusion or 
blockade zone outside the Pakistani port of Karachi. No specific zone was 
proclaimed, but any shipping, regardless of flag, was targetted on the high 
seas. India had a sufficient ratio of power to space to maintain its attacks 
on neutral shipping both within and without the zone of blockade. That is, 
while the purpose was aggressive, Indian power was sufficient to maintain 
a persisting and effective control of the zone affected as well as sea areas 
beyond it. The reasons that this persisting exercise of power did not become 
the target of angry repercussions in the rest of the world have been ascribed 
to the following factors: 
(i) The conflict itself was "short-lived-about a week;"141 
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(ii) Because of the shortness of the time of the blockade, Professor 
Daniel 0 'Connell believed that there was little time for reaction. He observed 
that, "[h Jad the naval blockade been prolonged and strictly enforced, 
however, the situation might have become very different, especially if the 
important tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz had been 
incommoded; "142 
(iii) Most of the shipowners who did suffer loss recovered through their 
insurance brokers under war risk clauses. In O'Connell's phrase, they 
"shrugged their shoulders" at the destruction that the Indian Navy inflicted. 
O'Connell did, however, also mention the case of the sinking of a Spanish 
ship. This ship's case "was taken up by the Spanish Government, which 
demanded compensation from the Indian Government. "143 He added: "This 
was refused. "144 
Although, from the lawyers' point of view, the issues raised by this conflict 
may have been left in an indeterminate and unresolved condition, their 
incompleteness provides an important invitation to resolve the facts left 
dangling in this way under international law. The Indian experience shows 
how the maintenance of an aggressive, persisting logistical strategy 
necessarily must be classified as illegal, despite its effectiveness, since the 
aggressive use of force against neutral shipping not concerned in the war is 
contrary to the basic principles of international law and the principles and 
purpose of the United Nations. 
D. Offensive (Aggressive) Goals Supported by a Raiding Strategy 
Although in both World Wars Germany proclaimed prohibited zones in 
which her submarines would sink merchant shipping, including neutral 
shipping on sight and without warning, the system was not one of maintaining 
a prohibited zone as such, but of creating hunting licenses for submarines. 
The zones were not predicated on the defensive requirements of the German 
homeland. Thus, they may be contrasted with the actions of Japan in 1904145 
and the United States in 1917146• In addition, they were carried out in 
fulfillment of a raiding strategy which depended on raiding tactics.147 At no 
time was there any attempt to hold a sea area by means even of persisting 
tactics, let alone of an effective and persisting strategy. The idea of 
establishing and validating a prohibited zone simply by means of a raiding 
strategy implemented by the surprise excursions of submarines on sink-on-
sight hunting missions constitutes a complete contradiction of the notion of 
maintaining, effectively, a prohibited maritime zone. 
While the sea areas proclaimed as prohibited to their adversaries (such as 
those by Germany in both World Wars and the United States in World War 
II) may not qualify as lawful maritime exclusion zones they may, possibly, 
be justified under some alternative rubric. For example, the United States 
zone might well have been upheld, at the time of its proclamation, as a reprisal 
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for previous illegal acts or policies by the Japanese naval and military forces. 
Such zones, however by their very nature, cannot be classified as complying 
with the requirements of self-defense, proportionality, reasonableness, and 
effectiveness. Nor can they be seen as providing validating persistent logistical 
strategies through effective and comprehensive enforcement throughout the 
zones proclaimed. Hence, they may not be viewed as legitimated by any 
emerging rule of customary international law dependent on effectiveness and 
reasonableness. 
An argument pointing, possibly, in favor of the validity of the German 
North Atlantic maritime exclusion zone and the United States zone of the 
Pacific may be founded on other, narrower, grounds, namely that the ships 
attacked were part of the enemy's war effort and were naval auxiliaries, not 
true merchant ships. This would leave as impermissible, however, attacks on 
neutral shipping. It would, further, lead to characterizing aggravated and 
unnecessary attacks on survivors in lifeboats, on lifeboats, or clinging to 
wreckage or other flotation gear as war crimes for which there would be 
neither excuse nor defense.l48 But this issue relates only to the limits imposed 
by humanity and necessity on the specific acts which a state or a commander 
undertakes when implementing a raiding strategy and faces the consequences 
of his immediate resort to raiding tactics. He runs a high risk of being 
stigmatized for engaging in the impermissible conduct that his actions may 
well entail. Such inhumane conduct as that attributed, for example, to Karl-
Heinz Moehle,149 and testified to in The Peleus Case150 remain impermissible 
under the Nuremburg Principles and decisions. 
E. Persisting Moveable Defense Maritime Zones Effectuated by Persisting Tactics 
Reference has already been made to the defense "Bubble" established by 
the United Kingdom on April 23, 1982.151 O'Co?-Ilell has pointed out that prior 
to that war operational zones consisting of a moveable circle centering on 
a naval or amphibious task force, "have the benefit of the precedent of the 
Spanish Civil War".152 This reference relates to the very interesting and 
largely forgotten Nyon Arrangements.153 Such a "moveable war zone" will 
assuredly have a wide application in the future. When shown to be consistent 
with such criteria as reasonableness, self-defense, and proportionality 
between means and ends, these zones are within what may be legally 
permissible. Professor O'Connell wrote in support of them "that they would 
not have the characteristics of the war zones condemned at Nuremberg." 
He warned, however, that "[t]his is not to eliminate legal doubts about the 
matter, but rather to indicate that the law appears to be sufficiently malleable 
to give naval staffs a certain freedom of manoeuvre in their planning. "154 
F. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to relate the question of the possibly emerging 
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legality, under international law, of certain types of maritime prohibited 
zones as instruments of war strategy. They have been seen, largely, but not 
entirely, as involved with logistical strategies, although these zones may also 
of course, be used to redirect shipping at the belligerent's strategic and tactical 
battle convenience, provide an early warning defensive system, and limit the 
area of belligerent activities in any specific contest. It is, of course, true that 
the goals of the interdiction of supplies to an enemy, the redirection of 
shipping, the establishment of defensive zones and the limitation of the area 
of a contest, are all lawful goals. The means and methods, including the 
strategies and tactics that provide the modalities of achieving these goals, may 
not necessarily or inevitably be justifiable. Lawfulness will, of course, depend 
on their specific characteristics and objectives. Also, some goals for which 
maritime exclusion zones may be deployed, for example, waging an 
aggressive war or for facilitating an act of aggressive and surprise attack on 
an unsuspecting victim, or indiscriminately operating against neutral shipping 
and failing to observe the principle of distinction, are clearly unlawful and 
are to be avoided by states proposing to establish such zones. 
With regard to lawfulness of the means and methods employed in furthering 
lawful ends, the attempt has been made to review the various strategies and 
tactics as they tend to be employed to facilitate the belligerent's goals. While 
some of those may be tainted with the unlawfulness of the ends for which 
they are used, others are, and should remain, unlawful per se on the grounds 
of their being tainted by their inherent wrongfulness. Their means alone are 
fatal to their legality. Examples of such tainting elements include their 
unreasonableness, their want of specificity of definition in space and time 
(including their failure to allow adequate time for neutral shipping to quit 
the proclaimed area), their ineffectiveness, and their lack of proportionality 
to the ends sought. Others may be invalidated by acts of specific inhumanity 
involved in their enforcement. They are also unlawful if they are simply used 
as means of giving further effectiveness to raiding strategies. 
This paper's purpose in coupling strategies and tactics involved with their 
goals was to examine the possibility of consecrating some maritime prohibited 
zones, especially those that scrupulously observe the principle of distinction 
and respect the rights of neutral shipping and commercial activities, as 
becoming increasingly acceptable and hence lawful by distinguishing them 
from those that remain unlawful. This was done in terms of viewing the 
strategies and the tactics to which the belligerent power resorted for the 
purpose of implementing the zone as part of its overall maritime war strategy 
and as part of his obligation to respect the rights, privileges and immunities 
of third parties. That is, the relevant strategies and tactics employed were 
examined in terms of determining the lawfulness not only of ends, but also 
of means and methods. This study has reviewed the interfusion of means and 
ends, and the manner in which they inseparably color, condition, and 
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characterize one another. Finally, a basic theme of this paper has been the 
review of those criteria for appraising the emerging legality of at least those 
maritime prohibited zones which show effectiveness, persistence, the 
principle of distinction, respect for neutral rights, humanity, and 
proportionality. 
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1. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has defined maritime exclusion zones (or "war zones") as follows: 
[A] war zone in maritime operations may be said to comprise an area of water which a belligerent 
attempts to control, and within which it denies to foreign shipping generally the same measure 
of protection which the latter might elsewhere claim. 
L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1952). 
v. 2, p. 681, note 1 [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht's Oppenheim]. See also, to similar effect, Julius Stone, 
Legal Controls of International Conflict (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 572 [hereinafter cited 
as Stone, Legal Controls]. Under certain circumstances, a maritime exclusion zone reflects a different method 
of waging war from that of conducting a traditional blockade. Such a zone may have merely the defensive 
object of keeping shipping, which might otherwise constitute a threat, away from an area, for example, 
of military operations. On the other hand, such zones may also be used for the purpose of denying an 
adversary access to resources, economic advantages of many kinds, and war materiel. In both cases, the 
object of the exclusion is logistical but may reflect a convergence of three distinct concepts: self-defense, 
blockade, and combat "killing grounds" (this last being a tactical rather than a legal concept). For a 
discussion of the various strategies involved, see, infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
2. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, Pearce Higgins 8th ed. (London: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1924) [hereinafter cited as Hall]. See also C.J.B. Hurst and F.E. Bray, eds., Russian and]apanese Prize 
Cases (Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein Co., 1972), v. 2, pp. 343-53 [The "Quang Nam"] [hereinafter cited 
as Hurst and Bray]; T.]. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1904), pp. 83-91. See also, infra § II A. 
3. See infra § II E. 
4. U.S. Navy Department, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Of£, 1987) [hereinafter Commander's Handbook or NWP 9]. 




9. See infra notes 30-34, and the reference therein to the Declaration of Paris of1856 and the Declaration 
of London of 1909. The text accompanying those notes discusses the treaty requirement of "effectiveness" 
for the purpose of establishing the validity of a blockade. For the practice of the United States with regard 
to the effectiveness requirement, and as reflected in the Civil War (or "War of Rebellion") 1861-65, 
See Dahlgren, Maritime International Law, Cowley ed., 1877, passim, and especially 25-61. The late Daniel 
P. O'Connell teaches us that the traditional concept (effectiveness) of the blockade required that it be 
"visible" and continued with the observation that it "required presence of the blockading force within 
visual range of the coast, although temporary withdrawal for reasons of stress of weather was not regarded 
as raising of the blockade." D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), v. 2, p. 1150 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, Law of the Sea]. Indeed some writers on the 
traditional concept of blockade, drawing an analogy with besieging a city, argued that the blockading 
ships should be at anchor. See, e.g., Stone, Legal Controls, supra note 1, p. 508. 
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It [i.e., the traditional concept of blockade] presupposed that anchored ships could, with safety 
to themselves, maintain close physical surveillance of the blockaded ports. It also presupposed that 
a blockading vessel's sight and reach was limited by the human eye and the telescope and flag 
signal. 
See also !Auterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, p. 779, where the author wrote: 
According to one opinion, the definition of an effective blockade pronounced by the First Armed 
Neutrality of 1780 is valid, and blockade is effective only when the approach to the coast is barred 
by a chain of men-of-war, anchored on the spot, and so near to one another that the line cannot 
be passed without obvious danger to the passing vessel. This corresponds to the practice followed 
before the First \Vorld War by France. (footnotes omitted) 
It should be noted that this is not the only view. See ibid., pp. 779-80, where we find a further statement 
regarding the second thesis concerning the requirement that the blockade must be effective: "According 
to this opinion, there need be no chain of anchored men-of-war to expose to a cross fire any vessels 
attempting to break the blockade; a real danger of capture suffices .... " 
10. "Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines," October 18,1907, 
T.S. 54, Statutes at Large, v. 36, p. 2332, reprinted in American Journal of International Law (Supp.), v. 2, 
p. 138 (1908). See especially, articles 2 and 3. It should be noted that in !Auterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 
I, v. 2, p. 781, we find article 2 to be stigmatized as "very unsatisfactory." 
11. See quotation from O'Connell, supra note 9. 
12. For a brief description of "Market Time" and "Sea Dragon," see infra text accompanying notes 
137 and 138. 
13. See Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (1987), pp. 57-59 [hereinafter cited as Archer 
Jones], especially at p. 58, where the author illustrated the term (from the Persian response to Alexander 
the Great's campaign in Anatolia 334-333 B.C.) as follows: 
Instead of assaulting the enemy's (i.e., Alexander's) army to defeat a Greek advance, Mardonius, 
the shrewd Persian Commander, had used his superb cavalry to raid the Greek army's supply bases 
to compel a retreat from its strong position at Plataea. 
As the rest of this chapter will testify, Professor Archer Jones's analysis and classification of the means 
and methods of waging war have been seminal to this writer's perception of the social and planning realities 
underlyin~. the laws"of w~~. It .sh?~~d be adde? .that, following. Professor Jones, this writer has also used 
the terms strategy and tactics In the tradmonal sense. See IiI., at p. I, where the author stated: 
An analytical approach to military operations permits one to divide the topic according to the 
three major components of the art of war: tactics, logistics, and strategy. Tactics should deal with 
combat and with the weapons, methods, and maneuvers on the battlefield. Logistics concerns 
providing the men themselves and the support of military operations, including the movement of 
armies and navies and the supply of weapons, food, clothing, and shelter for the soldiers and sailors. 
Strategy integrates tactics and logistics to determine the military objectives and the means of 
carrying them out. Naval warfare lends itself best to a separate treatment. 
14. Professor Archer Jones, id., at p. 55, also defines his seminal distinction between "raiding" and 
"persisting" strategies. He writes: 
\Vhereas the former [i.e., the "raiding strategy"] used a temporary presence in hostile territory, 
a persisting offensive strategy envisioned a longer, even permanent, occupation of the territory 
of the adversary or his allies. A persisting defensive strategy sought to prevent such an occupation. 
On both the defensive, and the offensive, the persisting strategy envisioned the possibility of conflict 
between the principal hostile forces; raiders, on the other hand, often could attain their objective 
without significant military conflict and frequently sought to do so. 
It also should be pointed out that Professor Archer Jones distinguished offensive and defensive tactics, 
so that a force, following an offensive or raiding strategy might occupy a strong position and then follow 
defensive tactics. Of course, he also envisioned the opposite-a defensive strategy enforced by offensive 
tactics. But, in this chapter the use of defensive tactics for the purpose of putting raiders in a defensive 
posture will be treated as engaging in offensive conduct. 
15. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Richard II, act II, scene I, line 48. 
16. Hall, supra note 2, p. 642. 
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17. Hurst & Bray, supra note 2, v. 2, pp. 343-53. 
18. This concept was explained in a letter of April 23, 1982, from the Permanent Representative of 
the United Kingdom to the President of the United Nations Security Council (S/14997), which stated, 
inter alia, that: 
In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on 
the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which 
could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic, 
will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaged 
in survei1lnace of these British forces wi1l be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with 
accordingly. 
Quoted in Geoffrey Marston, ed., "United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982," British Y,arbook 
of International Law, v. 53, p. 337 at pp. 540-41 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marston]. 
19. See Lawrence, supra note 2, pp. 83-93. 
20. U., pp. 86-87. 
21. These United States orders were reproduced in Amen·canJournal of International Law (Supp.), v. 12, 
pp. 13-22 (1918). See Hall, supra note 2, p. 642. 
22. Hall, supra note 2, p. 642. See also Judgments of Lord Sumner in The Stigstad, 3 B & C. P.C. 347, 
353, and Ertel Bieber and Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., Ltd., [1918] A.C. 260, 287. Hall, supra, note 2, p. 643, at note 
2, also refers to the early U.S. Naval War College Blue Book as approving of the Japanese orders. Su 
infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
23. Referring with approval to the Quang Nam case (which, of course, was prior to the Japanese orders), 
the influential Naval War College Blue Book offered the following solution to a problem based on the 
Japanese orders: 
The master appeals to the commander of a cruiser of the United States to escort him through 
this area [i.e., a maritime exclusion zone similar to those proclaimed by Japan in 1904]. The voyage 
would not bring the vessels within 5 miles of the coast of State X [i.e., the belligerent proclaiming 
the zone in question]. 
What should the commander do? 
SOLUTION 
The commander should decline to escort the merchant vessel though the strategic area. 
He should advise the master of the merchant vessel to keep clear of the strategic area. 
Naval War College, International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1912), pp. 114, 129. 
24. Archer Jones, supra note 13, points out, at p. 488, that: 
In former wars British blockades had hurt France's economy somewhat but had never had the 
effect that the [1914-18] blockade had on Germany, of reducing food consumption and handicapping 
industry because it had diminished or shut off the supply of such critical supplies as oil or copper. 
Never, too, had France's raiding strategy of attacking English ships come as near seriously menacing 
the British economy and ability to carry on the struggle as had the German submarine campaign 
against the allies. The navy's logistical strategy had acquired a new and perhaps decisive power 
in the industrial age. 
25. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, pp. 561-62, characterized reprisals in the following terms: 
Whereas reprisals in time of peace are injurious acts committed for the purpose of compelling 
a State to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by an international 
delinquency, reprisals in time of war occur when one belligerent retaliates upon another, by means 
of otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare, in order to compel him ... and members of his forces 
to abandon i1Iegitimate acts of warfare .... They have often been used as a convenient cloak for 
violations of International Law. 
26. For the British and Allied position in this regard, see Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, 
pp. 791-97, and Stone, Legal Controls, supra note I, pp. 504-07, 508-10. More generally, for the British and 
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German positions on their blockades as being justified by belligerent reprisals, see Robert W. Tucker, 
The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea (Naval War College International Law Studies, v. XLX) (Washington: 
u.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1957), p. 301 [hereinafter cited as Tucker]. See also, Clive Parry et aI., eds., 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1986), p. 337; Basdevant, 
Dictio/maire de la Terminologie du Droit I/J/ernational, (1960), pp. 529-30. 
27. Howarth, Sovereignty of the Seas (1974), pp. 283-84. 
28. Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order: The Legal Regulation 
of International Coercion (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 488-489 [hereinafter cited as McDougal 
& Feliciano]. 
29. Id. 
30. See "Declaration Respecting Maritime Law," April 16, 1856, Martens, Nouveau Recueil General, v. 
15, p. 791, art. 4 [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Paris of 1856]. Art. 4 of the Declaration provides: 
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient 
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. 
31. Naval Conference of London, "Declaration Concerning the Law of Naval War," Feb. 26,1909, 
Proceedings of tile International Naval Conference, held in London, December 1908-February 1909 (London: H.M. 
Stationery Office, 1909), Cd. 4555, pp. 381-93; reprinted in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, The Law 
of Anned Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, 3d ed. (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), p. 845 [hereinafter cited as Declaration of London of 
1909]. Note that the qualifier "really" in the Declaration of Paris of 1856 was repeated in article 2 of 
the Declaration of London of 1909. 
32. See Guichard, The Naval Blockade 1914-1918 (Turbet transl. 1930), pp. 16-18 [hereinafter cited as 
Guichard]. 
33. See infra note 40 and the accompanying text. 
34. See also supra notes 25 and 26 and the accompanying texts. 
35. See Archer Jones, supra note 12, at p. 499. On realizing the utility of the submarine as a raider 
carrying out a devastating logistical strategy, Germany began building an impressive submarine fleet as 
fast as possible. She was not, however, able, by developing an adequate ratio of power to the vast spaces 
of the Atlantic Ocean, to develop a persisting strategy. Her submarines were only able to fulfill raiding 
strategy and so, despite German calculations, enough food, materiel, equipment, and American troops 
were able to cross the Atlantic to ensure her defeat. 
36. Id., Table 8.3, p. 468. 
37. "Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines," supra note 10, arts. 
2-3. 
38. See supra note 30. 
39. Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of November 20th, 1950, 1. C. J. Reports 1950, p. 
266, at p. 276. 
40. Great Britain: Order-in-Council of August 20, 1914; France: Proclamation of August 23, 1914. 
41. See supra text accompanying note 32 for the outline of the facts showing. that it was in Germany's 
interest that the Declaration would govern the maritime commerce of both sides. 
42. Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 40-41. 
43. Id., p. 42. 
44. Guichard, Sllpra note 32, argues that the term "blockade of the Central Empires" was a misnomer, 
since the Entente Powers, who "had a very proper respect for the Declaration of Paris of 1856" which 
"prohibits the confiscation of enemy goods sailing under a neutral flag," merely seized and either 
sequestrated or returned to their owners such goods and did not confiscate them. Id., pp. 42-43. It may 
be noted, however, that Guichard also refers to "the blockade" and thereafter uses the word to describe 
the Entente's policy. Id., p. 62. 
45. See sllpra note 31 and texts accompanying notes 31-34; See also, Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 13-
19. 
46. Id., pp. 108-10. See also William S. Sims, Victory at Sea (1921), passim. 
47. See, supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also, supra text accompanying notes 32-34 and Guichard, 
supra note 32, at pp. 13-19. 
48. For a history of the negotiations of this affair, see Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 196-202. Guichard 
there records the increasing cordiality of relations in the last months of World War I, including acceptance 
of the claims of the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to the long distance blockade. 
49. See Guichard, supra note 32, at p. 97. For a history of this disastrously conceived piece of 
Hohenzollern diplomatic adventurism, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (1958), passim, 
and especially chapters 11 and 12, entitled "The Telegram in Washington," and "Obliged to Believe It." 
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Tuchman believed that this latter activity on the part of Imperial Germany had a far stronger inlluence 
on the United States' entry into World War I than Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. 
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50. IJ., pp. 97-98. 
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Order in Council of November 27,1939, to Italy," Stat. R & 0,1940 No. 979. 
54. For the Italian protest and the United Kingdom's reply, see Cmd 6191 (1940) at pp. 2-7. 
55. See "Order in Council Applying the Order in Council of November 27,1939, to Italy," supra note 
53. 
56. The similar claims by the United Kingdom, and later the United Nations, of a right of reprisal 
because they associated themselves with Germany's methods of warfare at sea, were subsequently made 
against Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. See Stone, Legal Controls, supra note 1, p. 504. 
57. Id. 
58. United Nations, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (1948), p. 492. 
59. "Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament," April 22, 1930, U.S. Statutes at 
Large, v. 46, p. 2858, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 31, p. 881. 
60. "Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of 
London of April 22, 1930," Nov. 6, 1936, AmericanJournal of International Law (Supp.), v. 31, p. 137 (1937), 
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 31, p. 883. 
61. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, Germany: 
International Military Tribunal, 1948), v. 22, pp. 556-61. 
62. The case of the British auxiliary cruiser Baralong in 1916 illustrates the public outrage of that country 
at Germany's indiscriminate submarine warfare. Su, [1916] British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No.1 
[Cd. 8144], reprinted in American Journal of International Law (Supp.), v. 10, pp. 79-86 (1916). Catching the 
officers and crew of a German U-boat in the act of sinking a British merchant ship, the captain of the 
Baralong ordered their summary execution on the spot. On the: German Government's demand that the 
British Government prosecute the 1atter's commander and her ship's company for murder and punish them 
according to the law of war, the British Government, without admitting the facts, justified the executions 
as retaliation against the ruthlessness of Germany's U-boat policy of unrestricted sinking of merchant 
ships. On the other side of the coin, see the German condemnation of the British policy of arming 
merchantmen and instructing them, as a last resort, to ram U-boats, even if signalled to stop and submit 
to visitation. This escalation of outrage culminated in Germany's conviction and execution, in July 1916, 
of Captain Fryatt, the commander of the merchant ship Brussels for having attempted, in March 1915, 
to ram the German submarine U-33. See Lautetpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 1, v. 2, p. 468, where Germany's 
act was stigmatized as "nothing else than a judicial murder." See also James Brown Scott, "The Execution 
of Captain Fryatt," American Journal of International Law, v. 10, p. 865 (1916). In his article, Scott, a leading 
American international lawyer and Editor of the Journal at a time when the United States was still a neutral, 
stated categorically: 
Ramming is an effective method of defense against a submarine and the fact that a submarine is 
a frail thing and cannot stand this kind of warfare is its misfortune, not the merchantman's fault .••. 
IJ., p. 877. Scott concluded his Editorial Comment with the following statement: 
If the views above expressed are correct that there is nothing in the law nor in the practice 
of nations which prevents a belligerent merchant vessel from defending itself from attack and 
capture, the execution of Captain Fryatt appears to have been without warrant in international 
law and illegal, whatever it may have been according to the municipal ordinances of Germany. 
IJ. See also "The Brussels: Captain Fryatt's Case," Pitt Cobbett, Leading Cases in International Law, Walker 
5th ed. (1937), v. 2, p. 131 [hereinafter Pitt Cobbett]. The author commented: 
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Gennany seems to have been the first nation to question either the right of active self-defense 
or the legitimacy of defensively anned merchant ships. Practice appears to have been wholly against 
her contentions. With regard to war on land, however, different considerations apply. 
u., p. 132. This last distinction was made because the Gennan Government justified Captain Fryatt's 
execution on the ground that he was a franc tireur, that is, a .civilian non-member of any fighting force 
who, without orders, snipes from behind cover at his unsuspecting enemy. Pitt Cobbett pointed out that 
the justification of making the franc tireur liable to "the severest treatment" has solid military reasons. 
"The essence of the franc tireur is not his commission of hostilities, but the element of treachery-he 
is a civilian one moment, a soldier the next. Having, as a peaceful civilian, watched the enemy soldiers 
pass, he then snipes at them from his cottage window." Pitt Cobbett finally contrasted the franc tireur 
with Captain Fryatt by pointing out that the franc tireur is under no fonn of discipline; there is no official 
superior to whom appeal can be made should he fail to observe the usages of war. Captain Fryatt, on 
the other hand, "though not a member of the anned forces of the Crown, was the head of a disciplined 
body of men, and was ... acting under the advice of the British Admiralty." U. In fact, it should be 
pointed out that Gennany, perhaps not incorrectly, had, in both World Wars, insisted on treating the 
British Merchant Marine as a naval auxiliary service, since those ships travelled in convoys under anned 
escorts, were defensively anned and, whether travelling in convoy or not, or defensively anned or not, 
were required by the British Admiralty to take active measures of self-defense if attacked, to radio the 
position of any Gennan U-boat seen by them, and to give the position of any observed underwater attack. 
If Germany argued this characterization of British merchant ships as naval auxiliaries in order to approbate 
their attacks on merchant ships, they should not have reprobated it in order to execute Captain Fryatt, 
whom they punished for being a civilian sniper, not a unifonned member of the auxiliary service. 
63. For a comment on both the limited size of the area and the Gennan maritime activity (invasion 
and occupation of Norway), see Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, p. 493, note 1. 
64. This was one of the notorious "Leipzig War Crimes Trials" held in Gennany in 1921. See American 
Journal of Intemational Law (Supp.), v. 16, p. 708 (1922). See also Pitt Cobbett, supra note 62, v. 2, pp. 156, 
158. 
65. American Journal of International Law (Supp.), supra note 64, p. 722. This case should be contrasted 
with the Dover Castle case, id., p. 704. The Dover Castle was also one of the Leipzig War Crimes cases. 
The vessel was a British hospital ship. She was clearly marked as such and was carrying no military 
personnel, munitions, or stores other than sick and wounded soldiers, members of the medical corps, and 
necessary supplies connected with that service. The accused commander of the submarine, Karl Neumann, 
was acquitted because the Dover Castle was sunk "in obedience to a service order of his highest superiors." 
U., p. 708. It should be noted that his latter case was distinguished from the Llandovery Castle also on the 
ground that the commander did not, as did Patzig, order the massacre of the survivors in lifeboats, or 
those on, or clinging to, rafts and wreckage, and in the water. See Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, 
v. 2, p. 569. On the Gennan Government's and High Command's policy, and order, of sinking hospital 
ships on sight, see id., pp. 504-06, note 1. See also the British refusal to recognize the immunity of Gennan 
seaplane ambulances in the English channel rescuing Gennan ainnen. U. pp. 506-07. 
66. The defenses of the "Laconia Order" (superior order commanding the killing of survivors of 
torpedoed ships) and of necessity were rejected. See Law Report of Trials of War Criminals (London: British 
Military Court, 1945), v. I, p. 1 [hereinafter cited as War Crimes Reports]. 
67. War Crimes Reports, supra note 66, v. 9, p. 75. This case also involved the "Laconia Order." 
68. U., v. 9, p. 82. 
69. See Tucker, supra note 26, p. 72, note 55, where the author writes: 
According to S. W. Roskill, with the one exception noted above [i.e., Helmuth von 
Ruchtesschell], the captains of Gennan anned merchant raiders" generally behaved with reasonable 
humanity towards the crews of intercepted ships, tried to avoid causing unnecessary loss of life 
and treated their prisoners tolerably." (footnote omitted) 
70. Clearly the conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom was a limited war, as to the 
participants, the area, and the weapons employed. For a quite detailed discussion of the seven zones 
proclaimed by both sides, for their characterization as "unusual," and for the comment that "[t]he rationale 
for these is difficult to detennine," see William J. Fenrick, "The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of 
Naval Warfare," Canadian Yearbook of Intemational Law, v. 24, p. 92, at p. 107 (1987) [hereinafter cited 
as Fenrick]. This writer believes that, at least in part, the proclamation of these zones (except for the 
ill-advised last one proclaimed by Argentina, which was implicated in the unnecessary bombing of the 
tanker Hercules, see, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp v. Argentine Republic, 830 F. 2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), reversed 
109 S. Ct. 683 (1989) ), helped to restrict the conflict to the disputed territory and localize the conflict. 
This writer agrees completely with Professor Howard S. Levie's comment in his contribution, "The 
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Falklands Crisis and the Law of War," in Alberto R. ColI and Anthony C. Arend, eds. The Falklands War: 
Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and Intanatiowl Law (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 64 at p. 76 
[hereinafter cited as Levie], where he listed the reasons why, in his opinion, the laws of war were able 
to exert their restraining influence: 
First, this was a limited war, fought for limited ends with limited means .... The adversaries 
restricted their operations to the disputed territory, and refrained from military actions against 
the enemy's homeland; had it been conducted otherwise, the war would have been much more 
violent and destructive .... 
71. The date 1982, shown in the text as that of the commencement of the Persian Gulf Tanker War, 
is predicated on the Iraqi attack on Kharg Island on April 29, 1982, and the Iraqi announcement of a 
Maritime Exclusion Zone in the Gulf on August 12,1982. The Iran-Iraq War in general, although limited 
as to participants, and as to area (but note the so-called "War of the Cities"), was not limited as to weapons 
(note the substantiated resort to gas warfare by Iraq, the latest example of which at the time of writing 
was reported in "Gas Explosion in United Nations," The Economist, August 6,1988, p. 31). One can be 
thankful that neither side had, apparently, nuclear devices. Unlike the Falklands Conflict, the Iran-Iraq 
war did not evidence restraints as to means and methods of warfare, nor in the treatment of prisoners. 
72. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
73. Marston, supra note 18, at p. 539. 
74. See supra note 30 and the accompanying text. 
75. Levie, supra note 70, p. 65. 
76. Marston, supra note 18, pp. 540-41. See also the text accompanying note 18. 
77. Marston, supra note 18, p. 549. See Levie, supra, note 70, p. 65. A further example of the British 
enforcement of "the Defensive Bubble" was the sinking of the Argentine "fishing vessel," the Narwal. 
She was shadowing the British forces and was "a spy ship with an Argentine Navy Lieutenant Commander 
on board sending back information about the [British] fleet's movements." Christopher Dobson et al., 
The Falklands Conflict (Falmouth, Cornwall: Coronet Books, 1982), p. 104. See also, Levie, supra note 70, 
p. 67 [hereinafter cited as Dobson et al.]. 
78. Marston, supra note 18, p. 542. See also for a discussion of the British MEZ of April 30, 1982, in 
light of the DoenitzJudgment, supra note 61, and the U.S. Navy Department's Law of Naval Warfare (NWIP 
10-2) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955, as amended) [hereinafter cited as NWIP 10-2], in Fenrick, 
supra note 70. 
79. Marston, supra note 18, p. 542. 
80. Id., p. 549. For enforcement of this zone, see letter dated May 1, 1982, addressed to the President 
of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. 
Dobson et al., supra note 77, p. 546. 
81. Marston, supra note 18, p. 549. 
82. !d. 
83. Levie, supra note 70, p. 66. 
84. !d. 
85. Supra note 70. The reversal of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's judgment was on 
the ground that the Court of Appeals had erred in assuming jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign with 
regard to a claim that was not within the exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 
28 U.S. Code § § 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, and 1602, et seq., especially § § 1604 and 1605. The Supreme 
Court also reversed the court below on the grounds: (1) That the United States' and Argentina's ratification 
of the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, April 29, 1958, United States Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, v. 13, p. 2312, does not provide domestic United States courts with an 
independent basis of jurisdiction; and (2) the Alien Tort Statute of 1789, U.S. Code, Title 28, § 1750, 
does not provide an independent basis of jurisdiction. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
provides the sole basis of jurisdiction in such cases. 
86. Amerada Hess, supra note 70, p. 423. 
87. !d. 
88. It should be noted that the United States sought to protect the neutrality of the Hercules, and the 
Government emphasized her neutral status to the Argentine Government. The court stated that: 
On May 23,1982, Hercules embarked from the Virgin Islands, without cargo but fully fueled, headed 
for Alaska. On June 3, in an effort to protect United States interest ships, the United States Maritime 
Administration telexed to both the United Kingdom and Argentina a list of United States flag 
vessels and United States interest Liberian tankers (like Hercules) to ensure that these neutral vessels 
would not be attacked. The list included Hercules. 
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IrI. See also the court's comment that "it is beyond controversy that attacking a neutral ship in international 
waters, without cause for suspicion or investigation, violates international law. " IrI., p. 424. 
89. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Aug. 7, 1981, v. 27, p. 31006 [hereinafter cited as Keesing's]. 
90. It should be pointed out that damaging attacks by both sides on their opponent's oil installations 
began as early as September and October 1980. IrI., pp. 31015-16. See also id., June 4, 1982, v. 28, p.31517. 
For an outline of the events concerning the exclusion zones in the Persian Gulf Tanker War, see Fenrick, 
supra note 70, pp. 116-22; Ross Leckow, "The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law of War Zones," 
Internationol and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 37, p. 629 (1988) [hereinafter cited as Leckow]. 
91. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1950] I. C. J., p. 266, at p. 276. 
92. The Court added the requisite psychological element by saying "and ... this usage is the expression 
of a right appertaining to the state granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial state." IrI. 
See also Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Internationol Law, P.E. Corbett trans. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 148-49 [hereinafter cited as De Visscher], where the former World Court 
Judge wrote: 
From the assimilation of custom to tacit convention, which in our judgment is quite fictitious, 
must be distinguished the requirement of opinio juris sive necessitatis, regarded here as reflecting the 
attitude of power in relation to a given practice. In its judgment of November 20, 1950, in the 
case of the right of asylum (Colombia-Peru)-a judgment which fixes its jurisprudence on this 
subject-the International Court of Justice clearly asserted the necessity of this psychological 
element of custom. (footnotes omitted) 
93. See the quotation from De Visscher, supra note 92, and note 27 on that page in which the author 
discusses the definition in the Asylum Case. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 
par. l(b), which "recognizes the existence of a custom only if the practice which is its content has been 
'accepted as law .... De Visscher, supra note 92, at p. 441. Again, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J., at 
p. 44, the Court reinforced its thesis in the Asylum Case with the statement that: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or 
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of 
the subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. 
94. Stone, Legal Controls, supra note I, p. 508. 
95. IrI., at pp. 508-09. Stone took his quotation from Statement of the Measure Adopted to Intercept the Seaborne 
Commerce of Germany, Misc. No.2, 1916, Cmd. 8145, p. 4. 
96. See, e.g., Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in Internationol Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1971), p. 72, where he writes: "Kopelmanas, following the old theories ofPuchta and Savigny, 
suggests that 'social necessity' is the basis of opinio juris." (Footnotes omitted) 
97. Thus D. P. Simpson, Cassell's New Latin Dictionory (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1960), p. 
778, tells us the use of sive "in an alternative conditional clause, whether ... or ... , sive (or seu) ... sive 
(or seu) )." See also id., p. 558, for its use in a disjunctive sense. 
98. C.H.M. Waldock, "The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf," Grotius Society Transactions, 
v. 36, p. 115, at p. 143 (1951). See also H. Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarines Areas," British Yearbook 
ofInternationol Law, v. 27, p. 376, at pp. 393-420 [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht, Submarine Areas]; Gilbert 
Gidel, "The Continental Shelf' (L.F.E. Goldie trans.), Annual Law Review (Univ. of West Australia), v. 
3, p. 87, at pp. 102-103 (1954-56); L.F.E. Goldie, "Some Comments on Gidel's Views," id., p. 108, at 115-
21; L.F.E. Goldie, "Australia's Continental Shelf: Legislation & Proclamations," Internationol and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, v. 3, p. 535, at pp. 557-59 (1954). But see "Report of the International Law Commission 
to the General Assembly Covering the Work of its Eighth Session, 23 April-4 July 1956," U.N. Doc. 
A/3159, [1956] Yearbook of the Internationol Law Commission, v. 2, p. 253, at pp. 295-99. Note especially 
commentary (8) on draft article 68. IrI., p. 298. 
99. D. P. O'Connell, Influence of Law on Sea Power (1975), p. 165 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, Sea 
Power]: 
When France was threatened by a plague of protesting yachts (which largely failed to materialize) 
the theoretical problem was deliberately made actual. Eventually, in 1973, France's notice to 
mariners went beyond declaring a zone Jangereuse and for the first time in the history of nuclear 
testing amounted to a temporary appropriation of an area of the high seas from which all shipping 
could be excluded. One yacht was, in fact, boarded; but to hustle away H.M.N.Z.S. Taranoki or 
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Canterbury was another matter. The outcome was a maritime pavane, executed with some grace 
and disparity, in which New Zealand made her point and France continued her testing. 
Had the International Court of Justice at the Hague found that the enclosure of the seas for 
the purpose of French nuclear testing was illegal, this might have ended speculation upon the legality 
of naval operational zones; if it had found that the enclosure was not illegal, it would have put 
a premium upon it. (footnotes omitted) 
100. Myres S. McDougal and Norbert A. Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful 
Measures for Security," in Myres S. McDougal et aI., Studies in World Public Order (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 763, 766-68, 802-07, and note 172, where, at the last citation, the authors 
point out that: 
The United States has established well over 400 such areas [that is, areas designated in "warnings 
to mariners" or similar notes of dangers to navigation either indefinitely or at certain times], ranging 
in size from less than a square mile to the vast area surrounding the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls, 
and in duration from a period of a few hours to many years. Other naval powers, including the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Soviet Union, have engaged in the same practice 
for similar purposes. Ordinarily, no claim is made to enforce warning areas by means of formal 
sanctions, and the normal responsibility for taking reasonable measures at the scene to avoid 
accidents is considered to rest with the authorities using the area for dangerous operations. Some 
danger areas are, however, announced in terms which make clear that the authorities using them 
are expected to enforce observance. 
In rare instances, criminal penalties are provided for unauthorized intrusions. In the Defence 
(Special Undertakings) Act of 1952, the Commonwealth of Australia created a prohibited area 
of more than 6,000 square miles, most of it high seas, surrounding one of the Monte Bello Islands 
in Western Australia, where atomic tests have been conducted by the United Kingdom. (authors' 
emphasis; footnotes omitted) 
See also O'Connell, Sea Power, supra note 99, and the reference to the more recent French policy of creating 
sanctions for breaches of its prohibitions against vessels intruding into its South Pacific nuclear testing 
area. 
101. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, Submarine Areas, supra note 98, pp. 393-98; J.D. MacGibbon, "Some 
Observations on the Part of Protests in International Law," British Year Book of International Law, v. 30, 
p.293. 
102. D'Amato, supra note 96, p. 99. 
103. !J. 
104. !J. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
106. See D'Amato, supra note 103, and quotation therefrom in accompanying text. 
107. See supra, notes 84 and 85 and accompanying text. 
108. The phrase "Military Economy" describes one of the "principles of war" (meaning, not legal rules 
but the prudential guides to waging a successful war) as prescribing that the commander should use enough 
force for the purpose of achieving his objective. It proscribes the alternative of squandering resources. 
Commanders, however, generally prefer to err on the side of "too much" rather than "too little, too 
late." Von Clausewitz writes, regarding this principle: 
In this manner, he who undertakes War is brought back again into the middle course, in which 
he acts to a certain extent upon the principle of applying so much force and aiming at such an 
object in War as is just sufficient for the attainment of its political object. 
Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Graham transl., 1908 Anatol Rapoport ed. (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), 
p. 375 [hereinafter cited as Clausewitz]. See also id. at p. 423, note 59, where the editor, Dr. Anatol Rapoport 
observes: 
Here Clausewitz admits a rational basis for a limited war. Still, in his view, the limitation of military 
objectives depends entirely on the political objectives, that is, war effort is to be commensurate 
with what is demanded from the enemy and what can be achieved. 
See also Archer Jones, supra note 13, at pp. 630-34 and 670-75. 
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109. Clausewitz always saw "absolute war" as being subject to "three modifying factors;" but he defined 
it for heuristic purposes as embodied in a contest that can "spring up quite suddenly and spread to the 
full in a moment" and consist of a "single absolute blow wreaking irreparable harm upon the enemy," 
that is, a harm in absolute terms "from which he may never recover." Such a blow is not "a passing 
evil." See Clausewitz, supra note 108, pp. 367-71. See also L.F.E. Goldie, "Book Review," Southern California 
Law Review, v. 36, p. 636, note 34 (1963). This review discussed, and at times compared, two annotated 
translations of General V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Diherstein et al. trans., Rand Corporation 
Research Study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), and V.D. Sokolovskii, Military Strategy, 
Richard Garthoff trans. (New York: Frederick A. Prager, Inc., 1963). It should be noted that the accurate 
translation of the book's title from the Russian original is "Military Strategy." 
110. See supra quotation accompanying note 108, and especially the reference to "military economy" at 
that place. 
111. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 1, v. 2, p. 218 (emphasis supplied). 
112. The "three limiting factors" Clausewitz described in "real," as distinct from "philosophical," war 
were: (1) The "non-conducting medium which hinders the complete discharge" of the will to wage war. 
This includes "the number of interests, forces and circumstances of various kinds ... which are affected 
by the War through the infinite ramification of which logical consequences cannot be carried out ... ;" 
(2) "The natural inertia and friction" of the parts that go into making of a "real war" as distinct from 
Clausewitz's "philosophical war;" and (3) The "vagueness and hesitation (or timidity) of the human mind." 
Clausewitz, supra note 108, pp. 368-69. Note also Clausewitz's comment, "Activity in war is movement 
in a resistant medium." ld., p. 165. 
113. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 1, v. 2, pp. 226-36; Stone, supra note 1, Discourse 18, "Ideological 
and Technological Factors in the Evolution of the Law of War," pp. 335-41. 
114. Clausewitz, supra note 108, at 267-70. 
115. U. 
116. U., pp. 102-03. Here Clausewitz defines his thesis of the "utmost use of force" with the conclusion 
that, "We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; 
as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action." 
117. !d. 
118. U. 
119. Levie, supra note 70, p. 76. See also Clausewitz, supra note 108, p. 403, where that famous author 
gives us the following interesting metaphor: 
Thus policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of War a mere instrument, changes the 
tremendous battle-sword, which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the 
body to strike one and fo~ all, into a light handy weapon, which is even sometimes nothing more 
than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries. 
120. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, Daniel Lee trans. 1964, (first published in French in 1961), pp. 
19-20 and passim. Indeed Trinquier quoted Clausewitz's stigmatization of "self-imposed restrictions" as 
equally applying in guerilla warfare where Clausewitz's maxim "to introduce into the philosophy itself 
a principle of moderation would be an absurdity" also applies. U., p. 22. 
121. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 1, v. 2, pp. 796-97. See also S. W. D. Rowson, "British Prize 
Law, 1939-1944," Law Quarterly Review, v. 61, p. 49 at p. 57 (1945), where the author states: 
In this war, except in the case of Germany, reprisals were instituted immediately war was declared, 
and in effect it was the outbreak of the war that was the breach of international law which gave 
His Majesty the right to initiate reprisals. One cannot help feeling that the time has come to remove 
any notion that such measures, by being termed reprisals, are extraordinary. Rather should it be 
made clear to the world in time of peace that in the event of this country being involved in war, 
the whole system of economic warfare as in force in this war will be reintroduced. It is now clear 
to all that neutrals cannot carry on during a major war without any interference whatsoever, and 
it is suggested that the certainty that these measures would be adopted if occasion required would 
be a valuable addition to the sanctions behind any new international order. In this connection it 
is interesting to recall that in both the last and the present wars the neutral nations who were 
most vociferous in their complaints of the British exercise of belligerent rights at sea have ultimately 
become allied to Great Britain and shared in the advantages of her system of waging economic 
warfare. 
122. See supra § II.D. 
123. James Mitchell, ed., The Random House Encyclopedia (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 2576. 
124. !d., p. 2463. 
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125. Supra, note 70. See also, text accompanying notes 85-87. 
126. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. See also, Stone, Legal Controls, supra note 1, at p. 510, 
and quotation from Stone accompanying note 129, infra. 
127. Leckow, supra note 90, at pp. 635-36. 
128. Id., p. 635. 
129. Stone, supra note 1, pp. 606-07 (footnote omitted). 
130. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
131. Fenrick, supra note 70, p. 124. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
133. See supra quotation in text accompanying note 75. See also Levie, supra note 70, at p. 65, where 
he also wrote of this early proclamation, "However, this was a perfectly valid and successful piece of 
• dis information ' by the British;" and more generally, the permissible use of misinformation as a ruse de 
Guerre. O'Connell, Law of the Sea, supra note 9, v. 2, p. 1140. 
134. See Leckow, supra note 90, p. 634, where he demonstrated that the British forces satisfied the 
proportionality requirement. He wrote: 
Ships regarded as hostile were subject to attack without warning. In order to claim the status 
of "non-hostile", vessels required the authorisation of the Ministry of Defence in London. Adopting 
a very balanced approach, Britain sought to apply the measures primarily against craft engaging 
in military operations. Argentinian merchant ships were permitted to enter the zone with British 
approval. Refining the procedures of the two world wars, Britain precisely defined the limits of 
the area and provided ample notification to all parties. Further, Britain was careful to observe 
proportionality, the system being enforced with a minimum of violence. Thus, British forces 
avoided any conflict with neutral ships. Even unauthorised Argentinian merchant craft were merely 
compelled to leave the area with no incidents of direct attack occurring. (footnotes omitted) 
135. See supra notes 18, 76-80, 125 and accompanying texts. 
136. United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 502, April 3, 1982, reprinted in International Legal 
Materials, May 1982, v. 51, p. 679. 
137. See O'Connell, Law of the Sea, supra note 9, pp. 1097-98. See also O'Connell, Sea Power, supra note 
99, at pp. 76-77. 
138. Commander's Handbook, supra note 4, par. 7.7.5. See also text accompanying note 8 supra. 
139. Supra note 136. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88. 
141. O'Connell, Law of the Sea, supra note 9, v. 2, p. 1099. 
142. !d. 
143. !d. 
144. Id. In commenting on the situation, O'Connell also states: 
The naval operations conducted by India against the port of Karachi and in the Gulf of Bengal 
took no account of international law, which was, indeed deliberately put to one side by the Indian 
naval staf£ 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
148. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
151. See Sllpra text accompanying note 76. 
152. O'Connell, Sea Power, supra note 99, p. 168. 
153. "The Nyon Agreement," Sept. 14, 1937, League of Nations Treaty Series, v. 181, p. 137, reprinted in 
American Journal of International Law (Supp.), v. 31, p. 183 (1937); and "Agreement Supplementary to the 
Nyon Agreement," Sept. 14, 1937, League of Nations Treaty Series, v. 181, p. 151, reprinted in American Journal 
of International Law (Supp.), v. 31, p. 183 (1937). For a history and commentary on the Nyon Agreements, 
see, L.F.E. Goldie, "Commentary [on the 1937 Nyon Agreements]," in N. Ronzitti, The Law of Naval 
Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus 
NijhoffPublishers, 1988), p. 489. 
154. O'Connell, Sea Power, supra note 116, p. 168. 
